Unrightable Wrongs: The Rehnquist Court, Civil Rights, and an Elegy for Dreams by Jones, D. Marvin
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles Faculty and Deans
1990
Unrightable Wrongs: The Rehnquist Court, Civil
Rights, and an Elegy for Dreams
D. Marvin Jones
University of Miami School of Law, djones@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United
States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
D. Marvin Jones, Unrightable Wrongs: The Rehnquist Court, Civil Rights, and an Elegy for Dreams, 25 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
Articles
Unrightable Wrongs: The Rehnquist
Court, Civil Rights, and an Elegy
for Dreams
By D. MARVIN JONES*
Full many a gem of purest ray serene
The dark unfathom'd caves of Ocean bear:
Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness in the desert Air'
Introduction
IT WAS IN THE 1960s that the federal government officially set its face
against discrimination in employment. 2 This new equal employment
policy represented, within the deep symbolism of our civil rights dis-
course,3 a national effort at alchemy. It was a legislative policy to trans-
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. B.S., 1973, Union College;
J.D., 1976, New York University. I wish to thank the many friends who have helped with
encouragement and criticism, hard questions and helpful suggestions. Many thanks, therefore,
to Steven Winter, Linda Greene, Pat Gudridge, Richard Hyland, Michael Fischl, Mary
Coombs, and Lesley Blank. I am also grateful to Brian Scher, Lisa Butler, and Joseph Alt-
schul for valuable research assistance.
1. T. GRAY, Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard, in THE POEMS OF THOMAS GRAY
75 (Poole ed. 1937).
2. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1990)). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1981). Section 1981 was originally passed in 1866 as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (1870). However, following the Reconstruction (1865-1887), the
statute fell into desuetude. It was in 1968, following Jones v. Albert H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968), that courts in the modern era began again to utilize section 1981 as an antidis-
crimination tool. The new legislation, in tandem with the new decisional law, represented the
high point of an erstwhile liberal era that began with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
3. The law generally, and civil rights law in particular, not only imports rules of con-
duct, it signifies for individuals structures of value and meaning. See W. HAMRICK, AN Exis-
TENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF LAW: MAURICE MERLEAU PONTY 129-40 (1987). The
central "meaning" of 1960's equal employment laws in these terms is the sheer fact that dis-
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mute the crude laissez-faire terms of employment law into the terms of
equality, a kind of golden rule.
Under the new policy, moral precepts of biblical antiquity4 were to
infuse the federal statutory framework with resplendent new legislative
prohibitions and commands. A reawakened national conscience was to
become the forensic equivalent of the philosopher's stone:5 something to
transform the formal structure of employment law from its base, ethi-
cally unrefined common law elements into a structure that reflected the
bright, shining egalitarian ideal.
The civil rights decisions of the Term6 ending in 1989 (hereinafter
"1989 Term") represent quite simply a reverse alchemy. The decisions,
to be sure, stopped short of expressly overruling key precedent. Yet,
through an ingenious verbal sleight of hand, the Court has altered anti-
discrimination law in fundamental ways. Doctrinally, prior to the 1989
Term, there were two theories of discrimination. One theory prohibited
discrimination in the form of intentional acts. A sister theory presump-
tively prohibited employment decisions which had disproportionate im-
pact upon blacks, regardless of intent. This doctrinal framework, in the
crimination is prohibited. This is what Foucault calls a discursive fact. See M. FOUCAULT,
We Other Victorians, in THE FOUCAULT READER 299 (1984).
By introducing prohibitions against discrimination into positive law, Title VII represents
not merely a prohibition but, in a real sense, a new baseline or norm of behavior. Ultimately it
connotes a reordering of the social world with equality norms above notions of laissez-faire,
with concerns about minorities as a group higher than contractarian notions of individual
employer prerogatives. Moreover, there is an intuitive linkage between such legislation and
society's sense of itself. Title VII represents America in a different way than America has
represented itself in the past, and at the same time offers America a reinterpretation of that
past. Id.
4. Leviticus 19:34. "But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one
born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself." Id.
5. The philosopher's stone contained a perfect essence which could penetrate all base
metals and transmute them into gold. C. JUNG, THE INTEGRATION OF THE PERSONALITY
228 (1939). It was called a philosopher's stone because of the implicit notion that the outer
world, like the individual's own interiority, was perfectible, each by infusion of philosophical
truth. Id. at 270. Jung understood this alchemical doctrine as an archetypal image standing
for the possibility of human resurrection and rebirth. These same archetypal themes are, in a
real sense, woven into the historical context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
6. The cases I refer to are: Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). Three other civil rights cases were decided last term: Jett v. Dallas
Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989); Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261
(1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). The latter three cases are, however, less
transparent for purposes of discerning the internal architecture of the Rehnquist Court's
model of "equality." For a discussion of these cases, see Clark, The Future Civil Rights
Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 795
(1989).
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teeth of stare decisis, has been cast aside: the two theories are collapsed
into a single intentionalist model.
The deeper change, however, is at the level of what Rorty calls our
"final vocabulary."' 7 Doctrine almost always paints over and attempts to
reconcile competing conceptions of the social world. In antidiscrimina-
tion law, we are engaged simultaneously in a contest between competing
ideas about what equality is, and competing ideas about what the role of
law is: indeed what law is. The two theories of discrimination reflected
an open ended "final vocabulary" that included both positive and moral
categories, a notion of law both as a process of adjudication and as a
social institution. Between the two poles of the theories, there was room
for discrimination law to refer both to allocation of rights between indi-
vidual employers and employees, and to a striving after national ideals.
The Court has in effect made this open-ended vocabulary disappear.
It has done so, not by eliminating the words equality or discrimination,
but by fixing narrow meanings to them. We are required to discuss and
think about the discrimination phenomenon in only one way. The Court
not only limits the options of civil rights plaintiffs, but through the sor-
cery of a rhetorical strategy, deprives us of the vocabulary we need to
conceptualize our rights.
Of course, as I write, there are still faint rumblings of curative legis-
lation in Congress.8 The problem is that, even if the current political
inertia could be reversed, the depth of the Court's conceptual shift mili-
tates against a quick legislative fix.9
What mediates between the Rehnquist Court's perception of itself as
conservative, and the implicit activism of the Court's reinterpretation of
the discrimination idea, is a set of blinding assumptions I call the "neu-
trality mask." There are three pieces to the mask.10 One piece is that the
7. R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, SOLIDARITY 73 (1989). "All human beings carry
about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs ... I shall call
these words a person's 'final vocabulary.'. . . It is final in the sense that ... these words are as
far as he can go with language." Id.
8. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
(vetoed by President Bush on October 22, 1990). See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
At this juncture, it seems unlikely this legislative effort can be revived.
9. Because the issue goes to the heart of how we conceptualize discrimination, legisla-
tion is only a partial answer. This is true because whatever legislation is passed will be filtered
through the interpretive lens that the Court has donned.
10. H. GATES, FIGURES IN BLACK 168 (1987). The Court's use of a figurative concep-
tual mask parallels the use of the "doll-wood" mask in the African tradition. That is, "the
mask is a vehicle for the primary evocation of a complete hermetic universe.., an autonomous
world, marked both by a demonstrably interior cohesion and by a complete ... [indifference]
to exterior mores or norms." Id.
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Court is enunciating procedure and not substance. Procedure, the Court
implies, is the opposite of policy or value choice, and the two categories
do not overlap. Another piece of the mask is that exclusively positive
approaches to law are somehow objective. And the final piece of the
mask is that formal equality marks the proper boundary of the equality
ideal. The mask is not constructed out of wood but rather out of rhetori-
cal constraints, by the fixed meanings the Court gives to words, by the
rigid categories the Court assumes everyone should use, and by the way
it assumes and suggests that these meanings and categories are natural or
at least inevitable.
My goal in this article is first to reveal within the civil rights cases
that the mask is there: that the Court has radically changed civil rights
law to fit its own assumptions, and that the Court covers up the fact that
it is indulging in its own assumptions through a rhetorical strategy. (In
describing the Court's constraints as a mask, I do not suggest that the
Court is intentionally obscuring anything. The "mask" is simply what I
see from an external standpoint. From the internal standpoint of the
Court, nothing is being obscured, no constraints are being imposed,
rather the Court is "recognizing" something that is "objectively" there.)
The discussion is organized as follows. In Part I, I attempt to sug-
gest from where, as a point of origin, the Supreme Court's approach is
derived. I locate the wellsprings of the Supreme Court's current juris-
prudence within a set of classical legal dichotomies such as the dichot-
omy between morality and positive law. I point out that these same
classical legal dichotomies mirrored, and were nearly coextensive with,
moral rationalizations for slavery and Jim Crow. As such, this classical
legal framework was in deep conflict with national ideals and with a na-
tional aspiration for the legitimacy of its political/legal order. (Here one
must read Myrda11 and Habermas 12 together).
I also examine the philosophical sources of this classical legal frame-
work: a nineteenth century judicial philosophy referred to as judicial
neutrality or judicial restraint. I try to point out that this notion of judi-
cial neutrality proceeds from circular assumptions about the nature of
legal interpretation and has only the most tenuous claim to logical coher-
ence. Thus, I begin by identifying the Court's current rhetoric of neu-
trality as both historically suspect and conceptually flawed.
11. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA; THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY (1962).
12. See J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975).
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In Part II, I discuss how in the context of the 1989 Term's civil
rights cases, the old model of judicial neutrality is twisted by the Rehn-
quist Court: notions of neutrality and restraint are used as a guise for an
activist attack on liberal civil rights precedents. I suggest how the Court
reinvents and reconfigures classical assumptions about judicial decision-
making and imposes them as rhetorical constraints on notions of equality
and law. In Part III, I take a look at historical parallels which I find
uncanny. In Part IV, I suggest why the Court's current approach, apart
from its internal contradictions, fails to provide society with what it
needs to transform itself and change.
I. Stories of Origin
For this mode, which we must call the spirit, breathes through the
universe and does not touch it; touches only the dark things, held pris-
oner, incommunicado, touches, judges, sentences and passes on. 13
A. Myth, Irony, and Divided Souls
America has dreamed a dream. 14 That dream was America's con-
cept of itself: A nation distinguished at the level of ideals by a special
Lockean"5 commitment to equal rights.
13. W. GOLDING, FREE FALL 253 (1959).
14. Genesis 40:8. "And they said unto him, We have dreamed a dream, and there is no
interpreter of it." Id.
15. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (T. Peardon ed. 1952)
(1st ed. 1690). Locke was a great proponent of natural law, particularly the contractarian
premise that just governments had power coterminous with the consent of the "the common-
wealth." Both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution resonate with Locke's
ideas.
There is also, lurking as a presupposition within Locke's moral theory and hence our own
constitutionalism, an ideal of reason which would be later delineated by Immanuel Kant. See
I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (T. Abbott trans.
1949) (1st ed. 1785). From a Kantian point of view, moral principles were discoverable by
pure reason and were absolute (imperatives) rather than relative or subjectivist; as such, they
were universal in application. Kant seems to echo throughout the American ethic. See, e.g.,
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (Jefferson's phrase about man's "inalien-
able rights").
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Americans, historically, saw themselves united16 by an egalitarian
spirit17 that invested their political institutions with life and meaning.
Thus imbued they, like the mythological Prometheus,18 presumed to
bring light unto other nations. Ironically, this grand egalitarian spirit -
so Promethean in character - was consigned by traditional choices of
the white majority to a Promethean fate.19
16. The centrality of the shared equality ideal to notions of national unity is attested to
historically by Jefferson's, Lincoln's, and later Lyndon Johnson's appeal to this value when
national unity was threatened. They each found, in a shared reverence for equality, a common
normative heritage which bound Americans together and took precedence over regional, eth-
nic, or racial loyalties.
See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident that all men are created equal and endowed by their creator with certain inaliena-
ble rights.") (emphasis added); The Gettysburg Address of President Abraham Lincoln (1863)
("Four score and seven years ago our forefathers brought forth upon this continent a new
nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.")
(emphasis added); Address on Voting Rights by President Lyndon Johnson (March 15, 1965)
("This was the first nation in the history of the world to be founded with a purpose, the great
phrase of that purpose still sounds in every American heart, North and South: 'All men are
created equal.' ") (emphasis added).
All sought to use an appeal to a shared reverence for equality as a means of not merely
evoking, but defining, a common national purpose. See also Ball, Stories of Origin and Consti-
tutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280, 2280-85 (1989) (add parenthetical explanation).
17. Spirit is to ideal, here, as Plato's objects were to shadow. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC
(B. Jowett trans. 3d ed. 1892). The notion is that, despite the abstract ambiguity of the equal-
ity ideal, there is a reality behind it, a moral reality that casts its shadow as an ideal. I locate
this "spirit," a collectivizing, animating force, at the center of America's national conscious-
ness. The spirit breathes through American history in the professed beliefs of Americans like
Jefferson, in canons like the Declaration of Independence, without touching American institu-
tions, yet touching American thought in the most interior way, creating a kind of moral center,
the point where all political and legal discourse begins.
18. Prometheus in the Greek myth was a Titan who stole the secret of fire from heaven
and shared it with Man. For his crime, Zeus punished him by shackling him to a mountain
where an eagle tore constantly at his flesh. Fire, of course, represents wisdom or enlighten-
ment, which is the sine qua non of civilization or, in Locke's terms, a sine qua non of a legiti-
mate political order.
19. Percy Shelley in his poem, Prometheus Unbound, explores this myth as a metaphor
about the opposition between power (or tyranny) represented by Zeus and idealism represented
by Prometheus. See P. SHELLEY, Prometheus Unbound, in SHELLEY'S PROMETHEUS UN-
BOUND 115-301 (L. Zillman ed. 1959). It seems there is a parallel duality within the American
dilemma. Prometheus is constrained because the "enlightenment" that he dares to provide
Man is a threat to Power. Similarly, the egalitarian ideal is constrained as a threat to the
power structure of the white majbrity which historically was linked to institutions, like slavery
and Jim Crow, which were imperiled by equality norms.
Finally, the fate of Prometheus is not merely irrational but represents the dialectic be-
tween rationality or wisdom and brute force. If, as Kant could be extrapolated to suggest, any
reasoned inquiry will show that moral fairness to blacks is a moral imperative, the treatment of
blacks was against reason and mirrors the mythical dialectic between rationality and the brute
force of majority political will. See Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, in SEVEN FAMOUS GREEK
PLAYS 5-42 (W. Oates & E. O'Neill ed. 1938) [hereinafter Aeschylus].
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As in the ancient story, the spirit remained immortal - in the realm
of America's legitimating myths.20 Yet, again paralleling the old story,
the spirit was historically constrained. It is historically constrained by
traditional racial policies within the high, ethereal realm of moral aspira-
tion, removed from the realm of moral choice.
21
The American imagination, in its dialectical machinations, had cre-
ated two worlds, and Americans lived in both at once.22 There was one
world in which Americans made practical decisions, conducted business,
and created institutions. This was the world of deeds. Here the major-
ity's desire for its own self-interest was enthroned, and higher truths re-
mained on a scaffold constructed by highly rationalized injustice.
23
20. I use "myth" here in two senses: one is as a story or narrative that helps explain the
world; the other is as a fairy tale or fantasy that covers up the world's profane aspects, e.g., the
story of the stork bringing babies. In the first sense, I refer to the narrative about equality that
occurs as a theme in the story of how this nation was founded and how American society came
to have it's formal emphasis on "equal justice under law." ("No set of legal institutions or
prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.") See Cover,
Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). This narrative is a "legitimating
myth" in that it makes it possible for Americans to think of themselves both as democratic and
morally whole. As narratives, these stories indeed, as Cover suggests, connect American insti-
tutions to the normative world or nomos. Id.
These stories about egalitarian traditions are myths in the fairy tale sense to the extent
that they are deeply contradicted by institutions like chattel slavery and segregation. In this
sense, the equality story operates as a kind of psychic detour on the bridge between nomos and
historical American institutions to connect Americans to a wishful, fictive reality. The equal-
ity narratives are signs by which Americans created a false national identity - a fictive self -
to mediate between themselves and the normative world they created. Id. at 5-11.
21. An ongoing constitutional debate follows the fault line between the "two realms":
moral choice and positive institutional commands. On the surface, the debate has been the
extent to which the law is positive versus the extent to which "moral" claims should find
expression. Cf R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 252 (1990) (For Bork, the Constitu-
tion is essentially positive, the textual equivalent of Austin's "command of the sovereign."
"The [positive] principles of the actual Constitution make the judge's major moral choices for
him. When he goes beyond such principles, he is at once adrift .... ). But see R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147-49 (1977) ("Our constitutional system rests on a particular
moral theory, that men [sic] have moral rights against the state... that argues for a fusion of
constitutional law and moral theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to take place."). Id.
22. This comfortable moral cosmology can be explained in Freudian terms. Lawrence,
The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 326 (1987). Lawrence suggests
that this framework for reconciling normative conflict begins in the unconscious as a defense
mechanism against anxiety. This "strain theory" would explain the conception of the two
worlds as a "symbolic outlet" for "emotional disturbances generated by social disequilibrium."
A shared "ideology" (moral cosmology translated into the political terms) flows from this
"because the disturbances... are common to all... so ideological reactions will tend to be
similar, a similarity only reinforced by the presumed commonalties in 'basic personality struc-
ture' among members of a particular culture." Id.
23. See W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 23 (1973). The image is from the
sorrow song which begins the second chapter:
Careless seems the great Avenger
Fall 1990] AN ELEGY FOR DREAMS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
But there was another higher world or plane in which Americans
interpreted their history, professed their beliefs, and justified themselves.
This is the world of the Word.24 On this elevated plane, the spirit was
perennially renewed. Here, the concerns of one's own heart, one's pri-
vate ideals, could be expressed. This division of the moral universe into
separate planes mirrored an inner dividedness, a fundamental ambiva-
lence about moral identity. It reflected a divided soul. 25
The moral fault line that divided the social world into separate
realms for the public and the private reflected a reciprocal and reinforc-
ing dichotomy between the public and the private self. Resting in the
interstices of this interface was a division between the self that considered
its own interest and the self that considered the rights of others.26
History's lessons but record
One death-grapple in the darkness
'Twixt old systems and the Word
Truth forever on the scaffold,
Wrong forever on the throne;
Yet that scaffold sways the future,
And behind the dim unknown
Standeth God within the shadow
Keeping watch above His own.
Id. One is immediately struck by the symmetry between the moral paradigm of Aeschylus and
that which DuBois depicts. See Aeschylus, supra note 19.
24. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). Cover identifies a
tension between judicial interpretation, the word, and the effect of interpretation to cause vio-
lence in the real world. In Cover's dichotomy, the law represents the sacred and its effects the
profane. In fact, the law is the means by which society rationalizes the profane violence de-
creed by courts. Id.
I identify a similar dichotomy between sacred and profane worlds, but I see the law tradi-
tionally as the handmaiden of racism. The law, historically, is itself profane. In these terms,
society needed to rationalize not merely the effects of the law but the law itself. I focus on this
prior, fundamental tension between law and democratic (l.e., egalitarian) values.
25. Perhaps the classic instance of this conflict is Jefferson, the founder. "I tremble for
my country when I reflect that God is just; that His justice cannot sleep forever .... " H.
ARENDT, Civil Disobedience, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 60-61 (1964) (quoting T. JEFFER-
SON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Query XVIII (1781-1785) (emphasis added)). No
less internally divided were judges who returned slaves, against their moral beliefs, premised
on a notion of the superiority of law over moral norms. Similarly, the Garrisonians were
abolitionists, but they were so tied to formalistic distinctions between law and morals that they
agreed to a textualist construction of the Constitution as pro-slavery and accepted the institu-
tion as formally legitimate. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 1-15, 150-54 (1975).
26. The self/other dichotomy is the axis around which traditional political theory or-
ganizes its understanding of rights and power. Everything proceeds from the assumption that
the individual is the proper unit of legal or moral inquiry. The self/other dichotomy is of
course a construct.
The individual is not to be conceived of as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom,
a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to
strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime
[Vol. 25
Along this moral dividing line an array of other normative conflicts
could be reconciled. Personal moral values were considered separate
from demands of positive law; claims of equality were separate from the
mandate of majority will; the aspirational idea that America was demo-
cratic was separate from the historical fact of slavery, Jim Crow, and
racial caste.
There was the hiatus of radical reconstruction. 27 This aside, how-
ever, the spirit historically remained confined within the lofty, abstract
plane of principles professed, bound there by tethers of majoritarian will
that moral aspiration alone could not remove. 28
But there was a hopeful, pregnant period, perhaps the second Re-
construction, 29 between the end of World War II and the advent of the
Rehnquist Era.30 Here again there was a break with history. In that
erstwhile era, so recent yet so distant in its moral tone, traditional, collec-
effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to
be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not vis-d-vis power; it is,
I believe, one of its prime effects. See Foucault, Two Lectures of M. Foucault, in POWER/
KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 98 (C. Gordon trans. 1980).
Surely the master/slave relationship is the paradigm for this problem. My symbolism of
the two worlds tracks the same self/other dichotomy but perhaps goes slightly further to rec-
ognize that the separation does not end at the separation of the white self from the black other,
but includes an internal division - a public self which, like the Garrisonians and the antislav-
ery judges, accepted the legality of slavery, and a private self that disapproved. Cf Williams,
Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Ra-
cism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 140-41 (1987) (linking the self/other dichotomy to internal
conflicts of blacks).
27. Eric Foner dates this "radical reconstruction" period from 1867 (when "radical
republicans" in Congress "swept away Southern governments and fastened black suffrage upon
the defeated south") to 1877 (the date of the Hayes Tilden Compromise when, in exchange for
favorable resolution of a dispute over the Presidency, the Republicans agreed to remove the
Northern troops which had enforced civil rights laws). During Reconstruction, a panoply of
civil rights laws were passed, blacks were elected to office, and began numerous businesses.
These black gains were largely swept away after 1877. See E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, at xix (1988).
28. I locate the problem at two levels: the level of individual moral choices, and the level
of the majority's political decisions about how it ordered its institutions. Cf G. MYRDAL,
supra note 11 (discussing the problem in a sociological context). See also R. COVER, supra
note 25, at 147-48 (discussing the inner conflict within antislavery judges).
29. See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 6 (1987) (suggesting parallels between the
period following the Civil War and the present era in terms of civil rights laws being passed as
"symbols of redemption," then abandoned when the laws do not by themselves bring
redemption).
30. William Rehnquist was appointed Chief Justice by President Reagan on September
25, 1986. Until Justice Powell's departure in 1987, however, the Court was still tenuously
moderate to liberal with Powell often acting as the swing vote. Powell was replaced by
Anthony Kennedy on February 11, 1988, with devastating effect. The Court has pursued a
dramatically conservative course since then. By "Rehnquist Court" I refer to the Court's
strong conservative bent evident since Kennedy's appointment. See Chemerinsky, The
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tive ambivalence yielded to a tentative consensus to redeem the Ameri-
can soul from the sins of the past.
Of course, America remained in conflict about the perennial,
polycentric problem of race.31 But mediating between liberal and con-
servative,32 between the defenders of the status quo and the insurgent
forces of change, between those under the banner of gradualism and
those who wished to move with less deliberation and a little more speed,
was a shared assumption that America's thumb rested on the scale of
justice in favor of the civil rights3 3 of blacks.
The Supreme Court, always the mirror of national consciousness,
reflected the political context of which it was a part: there was a slim,
fragile, liberal majority on the Court.
In those days, questions about affirmative action and other civil
rights issues - essentially political issues which were translated by a
uniquely American constitutionalism into legal disputes - were the fo-
cus of grand court battles just as they are now. But, on these substantive
civil rights issues, the Court followed a path, though sometimes erratic,
that roughly tracked the inertia of its liberal consensus. Within the brief
moment of this liberalism, the ideal of equality found doctrinal expres-
sion in a legion of minority protective landmarks ranging from Brown v.
Board of Education 34 to Griggs v. Duke Power Co.3" For a time, through
Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43
(1989).
31. "Polycentrism" refers to problems which are "many centered, much like.., a spider
web, in the sense that resolution of a polycentric dispute would necessarily have broad reper-
cussions." See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreward: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1979).
32. I use the terms "liberal" and "conservative" in their ordinary meaning in American
political discourse. Cf Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment on the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV 1593 (1987) (liberalism refers to individualistic conceptions of
law). See also Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983)
(liberalism is an antonym to communitarian political conceptions); Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979) (liberalism refers to objectivist
assumptions about individual rights); Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656 (1987)
(liberalism refers to contemporary legal theory and the artificial conventions and constructed-
ness of that theory). Under the "critical" approach, traditional categories of liberal and con-
servative would be lumped together into one "liberal" category.
33. By civil rights I refer to rights embodied in legislation, as opposed to common law,
that guarantees equal treatment of blacks. In modern terms, civil rights encompass restraints
upon both government and private action. This must be contrasted with "civil liberties" which
connotes a panoply of "natural rights" of the individual, expressed in constitutional restraints
on governmental power (e.g., freedom of speech, religion). Civil rights can also be distin-
guished from political rights which refer generally to rights of political participation (e.g., the
right to vote). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 223, 250, 1043 (5th Ed. 1979).
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs held that an employment practice or test although
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the redemption of a new civil rights approach, America's Promethean
spirit was unbound.
In that era, the chief slogan of the conservatives on the Court, car-
ried into constitutional battles like a sword of righteousness against the
social claims of the liberals, was the call for judicial self-restraint.
36
Armed with the idea of judicial self-restraint, the conservatives sought to
create within the law an empire of reason distinct from politics and im-
pregnable to sentiment and socio-economic concerns. By keeping the
territory of law free of the encroachments of passion and politics, certain
fundamental principles could be kept safe: procedural fairness, and even
justice as fairness, a notion of value neutrality that foreclosed ideological
leaning to one side or another in a constitutional debate. Thus, there was
a sense that in defending the judicial citadel against the instrumentalism
of social reformers, something very noble was being preserved.
What is most interesting about the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court in the area of civil rights is that, much like the mythical Camelot's
Arthur, the Court has lost its sword.37 Ideas like judicial self-restraint
and respect for precedent have lost their power. And the Court, in the
major civil rights decisions of the 1989 Term, simply broke with those
constraints to strike down precedents they did not like. To the extent
that the major decisions of the 1989 Term are instructive, judicial self-
restraint, which served as an organizing principle of judicial decision-
making, has been largely discarded in the area of civil rights. In going
about the task of interpreting the Constitution in the civil rights context,
principles that required judges to be value neutral have been replaced by
facially neutral was nonetheless facially discriminatory under Title VII if it adversely impacted
upon blacks. Id.
36. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding state legislative districting
scheme constitutionally invalid as a denial of equal protection where black votes were, in ef-
fect, diluted by preservation of district boundaries that no longer reflected geographic distribu-
tion of population). In dissent, Justice Harlan invoked the classic command of original intent:
"the Equal Protection clause was never intended to inhibit the States in choosing any demo-
cratic method they pleased for the apportionment of their legislatures." Id at 590-91 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). See also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that Title
VII does not prohibit voluntary affirmative action programs by private employers). In dissent,
Justice Burger accused the Court of ignoring both the constraints of the text and the proper
parameters of judicial review. "I cannot join the Court's judgment... because it is contrary to
the explicit language of the statute and arrived at by means wholly incompatible with long-
established principles of separation of powers." Id at 216 (Burger, J., dissenting).
37. Through either seduction or enchantment, Arthur is lured aboard a "silken ship,"
imprisoned, and deprived of his sword, Excalibur, for a time. R. CAVENDISH, KING ARTHUR
AND THE GRAIL 50-53 (1978). The sword was given to a rival knight whom Arthur was
required to fight in order to regain his freedom. Id. As Excalibur represents Arthur's virtue,
he is in a real sense in conflict with himself. Id.
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principles that require judges to protect certain substantive and interpre-
tive values.
These principles can be reduced to two guiding assumptions. First,
the Rehnquist Court, using a rhetorical strategy, postulates that discrimi-
nation can only be defined one way. 38 In my view, discrimination is de-
fined with reference to some notion of equality. As will be seen below,
there is a dividing line that separates formal equality and real equality.
We will see that it is the same line that separates fault-modeled notions of
intentional wrongdoing from broad social patterns of racial exclusion.
For the Rehnquist Court, the boundary of this dividing line defines
how far courts may go in addressing discrimination claims. If plaintiffs
can show a causal nexus between intentional acts and patterns of exclu-
sion, fine. But where courts are confronted with a statistical picture of
racial imbalance, no matter how extreme, unless that pattern can be con-
nected to a wrongful intent, no discrimination can be found. Where the
Warren and Burger Courts' precedents fall outside of these fixed bounda-
ries, the Court has simply revised the doctrine. Precedent is tested by a
moral or normative standard: Does it fit within the contours of the no-
tion of formal equality? To be sure, the Court's modus operandi has been
to make its normative revisions in what is traditionally denominated as a
procedural context: What standard of review is appropriate in a minor-
ity set-aside program (Croson)?3 9 What theory of proof may be used
where subjective employment practices are involved (Wards Cove)?4°
What are the limits of subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(Patterson)?
41
The difficulty is that procedural frameworks - e.g., standards of
review, theories of proof, etc. - are the vehicles of social policy and
normative choice. By raising the standard of review or level of scrutiny,
by narrowing the theories of proof which are available, by altering the
procedural framework in crucial ways, the capacity of the law to achieve
its normative goals can be easily circumscribed. The Rehnquist Court's
38. By "rhetorical strategy" I mean that the Court, while purporting to define concepts,
is really engaging in a kind of tactical wordplay. It is not defining terms but merely placing
artificial constraints on the "use of legal concepts." See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 32
(1986). Dworkin argues that law is not a plain fact whose contours can be observed, but
something which we arrive at through a process of interpretation. Some legal theories none-
theless speak of law as a plain fact or objective reality. Dworkin points out that, from what we
know about different "theories of meaning, plain fact," theories define only a particular way of
talking about law, not the law itself. Id.
39. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
40. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
41. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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decisions represent quite simply a sweeping, intensely ideological rejec-
tion of the most basic normative assumptions of the liberal approach to
civil rights. This sweeping substantive rejection is only thinly veiled by
the nominal procedural context in which the rejection occurs.
This brings us to the second guiding assumption: that interpretation
in the area of equal rights can only be done one way. Precedent is tested
again: Does its underlying interpretive structure fit within the contours
of the Rehnquist Court's rigid notion of law?
The traditional interpretive approach assumed a sharp distinction
between law and policy, judicial decisions and moral choice, dichotomies
which collapsed for the Warren Court in Brown v. Board of Education.
42
Brown inaugurated not merely the beginning of a new era of racial equal-
ity, but a progressive interpretive approach in which social needs and
moral imperatives - the need to close the gap between myth and reality
in civil rights - became the arbiters of what was required in a given
case.4
3
The Rehnquist Court, in the first instance, is making an all out as-
sault on Brown and its prodigy. Of course, it is not the surface principles
of Brown but the interpretive method of Brown which is under assault.
And it goes further. Beyond simply discarding precedents premised on a
progressive interpretive approach, it seeks to reintrench, once and for all,
the old interpretive dichotomies:44 positive law vs. moral claim, public
vs. private responsibility, the command of original intent vs. the ideal of
42. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
43. Brown redefines the method of inquiry by situating the Court in the real world as
opposed to the formal reality of pure legalism. First, it removed certain adjudicative blinders
to what was going on in society. In Brown, sociological data scorned by the formalistic juris-
prudence of the past became crucial. The focus of the inquiry shifted from a search of what
the fourteenth amendment meant - the Court in Brown simply says that the actual intent of
the fourteenth amendment is unclear - to the needs of society, more specifically, inter alia, to
protect young "hearts and minds" from the destructive effects of segregation.
Second, it develops a notion that constitutional rights - here equality - have moral as
opposed to merely legal content, thus demanding an inquiry into what is right as opposed to
what the law requires. Through the window of this morally grounded notion of equality, the
Court was able to focus on real world concerns: the notion of equality in Brown encompasses a
paramount concern for black children as a group, and the effects and consequences of discrimi-
nation ot1 black children. In the Brown Court's model of equality, group rights to equality
were morally superior to individual rights of the white citizens to express contrary associa-
tional preferences; and the substantive evil of injury to black children - a concern for result
- was superior abstract legal questions like whether the intent of the framers allowed them to
intervene.
44. These "interpretive dichotomies" are correlative of moral dichotomy and/or moral
dilemma. If law is only positive, l'icking moral content, how does law legitimate itself? See J.
HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 97-99. If, as a matter of public obligation, one must obey the
will of the majority, how does one exercise "freedom of conscience"? Moreover, as noted
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equal rights. This it attempts, again, through a rhetorical strategy:
through the meaning it gives to the word law, and how it juxtaposes its
positive concept of law with its above-mentioned concept of
discrimination.
Discrimination is defined first of all as a legal term, relying on a
notion of law in a strong sense. In searching for the meaning of statutes
and constitutional phrases bearing on this "legal" concept, we are to be
positive rather than normative in our approach. Jurisdictional concerns
trump social claims, the command of text or original intent (the original
command of the sovereign) trump considerations of historical or real
world context.
For example, in the past, chronic racial segregation might have been
held illegal and unacceptable viewed through the lens of history and so-
cial context. It will not meet the current interpretive standards. Simi-
larly, interpretive approaches that relied upon moral inquiry, that relied
upon concepts of stigma or the need to eradicate caste, are foreclosed.
Through a rhetorical strategy, by the way it cabins the meaning of
words like equality and law, the Court seeks to impose its own conserva-
tive views on discrimination as pre-emptive of all other views. The Court
imposes ideology by the very constraints it imposes on language itself.45
The irony, of course, is that on the one hand, the Rehnquist Court
seeks to redefine the law in the image of its own conservative values. On
the other hand, it seeks to do so by throwing out precedent, and by en-
gaging in an activism that is the antithesis of the classic "restrained"
conservative approach. It is trapped in an internal contradiction. It has
entangled itself at the interface between values and procedure in a di-
lemma which mirrors the historic conflict between the values Americans
professed and the moral choices Americans made. It has entangled itself
in an interpretive dilemma: a conflict between an avowed adherence to
the norm of neutrality (values professed) and a newfound activism
(moral choice).
above, these legal dichotomies, ironically so threadbare of moral legitimacy, historically were
instrumental, conceptual devices in rationalizing institutions of slavery and segregation.
45. The Court builds these linguistic constraints in steps. The Court begins by assuming
fixed meanings for certain legal terms, like discrimination, which "meanings" express narrow
ideological values. The Court then presents these assumed meanings as a system: as principles
related to one another in a coherent unity of one "objective" legal order. By using the Court's
artificial language of equality over and over, we cease to be conscious of ourselves as expressing
arbitrary constructs. As the workman's tool becomes part of his arm, so both the language
and the ideological artifice within it become part of us. This system of meanings becomes
indistinguishable from a system of linguistic rules in which the fixed meanings of words appear
as something natural, objective, value free. See W. HAMRICK, supra note 3, at 138.
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The conflict here is not merely aesthetic - a matter of mere incon-
sistency - it is ultimately moral. The Court professes to continue to
believe that discrimination is wrong, while at the same time rejecting the
very precedents which would allow courts to consider situations involv-
ing patent, gross inequality in real world terms. The Court sees that dis-
crimination is wrong, but does not see the validity of precedents and
theories that would allow us to address that discrimination in the real
world. (This is the old dilemma reborn.) The Court achieves this double
vision by nominally retaining the surface principles of the old civil rights
decisions, while throwing out entirely the moral content of those deci-
sions. In principle, the Court is against discrimination, but discrimina-
tion to the Court means something very specific, very narrow, and
ultimately empty of value to blacks.
If the Court's rhetorical constraints on equality create a double vi-
sion, the Court's rhetorical constraints on interpretation mask the di-
lemma altogether. In the Court's vocabulary, legal interpretation has
nothing to do with morality. Judges ought not to consider moral impera-
tives when searching for the meaning of terms like equal protection. As
such, there can be no dialogue about the conflict between legal institu-
tions and values because the question of such conflict appears incoherent
to the Court. This approach to the meaning of legal discourse prevents
us from being able to see, much less discuss, the gap between egalitarian
ideals and reality. As such it brings the original dilemma back to life.46
What is it that blinds the Court to its own ideological narrowness?
And how can it, in substance, refuse to respect precedent and still per-
ceive itself as a conservative Court?
What has happened is nothing less than a paradigm shift in which
the notion of restraint - whose operative concept was neutrality - has
been redefined. The old model of neutrality looked inward. It asked
judges to examine their interpretive processes to make sure that they
were "following the rules laid down." Following precedent was one of
those rules. The new model, the model of false neutrality, looks outward.
It looks not at the self, but at the liberal others: Are they imposing only
a neutral, formal notion of equality? Does the precedent they rely upon
have a foundation in the legitimate grounds of law? Or, is it based on
liberal moralizing and historical speculation? Precedent is no longer
sacred.
46. Clearly, the Court's present rejection of "constitutional realism" is a rejection of
Brown; not the doctrinal holding, but the hierarchy of values that it stood for, the notion that
moral imperatives - what is right - were superior to legalistic concerns.
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Neutrality remains a posited central value, but it is now defined in
terms of common law baselines and positivism. If the doctrine their "lib-
eral" predecessors have established respects common law baselines and
rests on good, positive legal interpretation, fine. But if the liberal doc-
trine has gone outside of those boundaries, the liberals have not been
neutral, and the doctrine is ultra vires and must be brought back into
line. Neutrality no longer means avoiding the imposition of judicial val-
ues. It means keeping out the "wrong" values, le., values that threaten
to alter pre-existing boundaries of the law.
The stakes in this battle over boundaries are both how much power
equality should have to define legal discourse, and how much power the
concept of legal discourse should have to define equality? It is a struggle
simultaneously between competing images of social justice, and compet-
ing images about the foundations and nature of legal judgment, as is seen
more clearly below.
B. The Empire of Restraint
What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it the
right way. The circle of understanding... is not to be reduced to the
level of a vicious circle or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In
the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of
knowing.47
That which was reason in the debate of a commonwealth, being
brought forth by the result.., must be law .... Again, if the liberty of
a man consists in the empire of his reason ... then the liberty of a
commonwealth consists in the empire of her laws ... ; and these I
conceive to be the principles upon which Aristotle and Livy... have
grounded their assertion that "a commonwealth is an empire of laws
and not of men."
'48
The great burden of legal interpretation is that it must justify its
judgments in an authoritative way. 49 Unlike poetry or philosophy, its
business is in part reason, but more importantly, action. As Professor
Cover notes, "A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a
result somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his
life."' 50 Historically, this need for authority has been understood as a
need for certainty in interpretation of legal texts, a need for a way to
47. D. Hoy, THE CRITICAL CIRCLE 3 (1978).
48. J. HARRINGTON, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF
JAMES HARRINOTON 170 (1977).
49. Note, Epistemological Foundations and Meta-Hermeneutic Methods: The Search for
a Theoretical Justification of the Coercive Force of Legal Interpretation, 68 B.U.L. REV. 733
(1988).
50. See Cover, supra note 24, at 1601.
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ground the decisions made in something unshakable and unalterable.51
According to Heidegger, interpretation is inevitably circular and always
surrounds the analyst with his own subjectivity.
52
Either because it has disagreed with Heidegger, or simply because of
this insistent need to ground its results, the law has created interpretive
constructs to govern how courts should look at things and to provide the
"certainty" that is needed. These interpretive constructs are what Pro-
fessor Peller simply calls metaphors for organizing the social world.
53
Typically, constitutional scholars look to a variety of ideas in
searching for these "metaphors": notions of formalism vs. realism; inter-
pretivism vs. noninterpretivism. In this discussion, judicial restraint is
viewed as a distinct issue, something both separate and secondary 'as a
category of concerns. In my view it is much more. Judicial restraint is a
metaphor in Peller's sense.
It organizes the world spatially by suggesting that there is a finite
area in which the Court can make decisions, and beyond which the deci-
sion is for another branch of government, the legislature for example. It
also organizes "the world" temporally by intimating that certain ques-
tions are, or occur, before other questions; the question of who should do
something comes before what should be done. Judicial restraint is the
exact gravitational center of such concepts as formalism and positivism
- the notion that the Constitution lacks moral content and
interpretivism.
Moreover, these concepts, with restraint as the center, are part of a
coherent whole, a cognitive model for conceptualizing what the Constitu-
tion is. Let us take a minute to sketch the outlines of this model of "re-
straint." What makes it a central metaphor is that it is through the
concept of restraint and its corollaries that the law resolves its anxieties
about the need for certainty and, in effect, escapes out of the "critical
circle." Courts traditionally circumvented the search for certainty by
postulating or presupposing a certain ambit of authority. Within that
ambit questions of validity were quite simply suppressed. The question
51. See Note, supra note 49.
52. M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 194 (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans. 1962).
Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have under-
stood what is to be interpreted. This is a fact that has always been remarked ....
But if interpretation must in any case already operate in that which is understood,
and if it must draw its nurture from this, how is it to bring any scientific results to
maturity without moving in a circle.
Id.
53. See generally Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151
(1985).
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was simply: "How do we find and preserve this area of authority in
which judicial decisions are so privileged?" I suggest this area of author-
ity is coterminous with the area circumscribed by the "law." It is
through the complex concept of judicial neutrality or restraint that
courts classically have located and guarded this sacred ground.
Thus, this metaphor about restraint/neutrality is not only about
principles of proper legal decision-making, but about first principles; not
only about classical conceptions of what is integrity in legal decision-
making, but finally about classical conceptions of what is law. It follows
that the true source of power for the Rehnquist Court in its use and
reliance upon restraint is a reliance upon a kind of foundationalism.
54 It
is this foundationalism implicit in restraint/neutrality that inspires and
empowers the Rehnquist Court to use restraint/neutrality concepts as
the "stuff" for a wall between liberal precedent and its own doctrine,
between "legal discourse" and inquiry into social context and moral
values.
Premised on Harrington's aphorism that we should be a "govern-
ment of laws and not of men," 55 the idea of judicial self-restraint is that
judges should follow the neutral principles of law in making their august
decisions.56 Thus, judicial self-restraint begins as a claim that court deci-
sions are legitimate when they are, and because they are, far from exer-
54. By foundationalism I refer to the idea that legal judgment can be validated by
grounding legal judgment in certain "objective" criteria. I also refer to foundationalism as an
assumption: that interpretation can occur separate from the values and desires of the inter-
preters. Finally, I refer to it as a kind of strategy for suppressing or rejecting as incoherent
grounds for decision other than those grounds authorized in the theory. For a more deeply
philosophical discussion of "foundationalism," see Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69
B.U.L. REv. 781, 793 (1989) (foundationalism refers to "a mind-independent reality consisting
of first principles either of fact or value").
55. Harrington's original phrase comes to us by way of John Marshall in the classic opin-
ion Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Marshall, translating the Euro-
pean political vocabulary into the American idiom, substitutes "government" for "empire."
56. See H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 21 (1961).
"[T]he main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled,
resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons
quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved ... [resting] on grounds of adequate
neutrality .... (emphasis added). See also R. BORK, supra note 21, at 2 ("The democratic
integrity of Law, however, depends entirely upon the degree to which its processes are legiti-
mate. A judge who announces a decision must be able to demonstrate that he began from
recognized legal principles and reasoned in an intellectually coherent and politically neutral
way to his result."). Cf Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 785 (1983) (arguing, inter alia, that neutral
principles are premised on an unexamined false assumption about legal language: that "we all
know... what the words and rules used by judges mean.").
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cises in the mere naked preferences of the judges themselves; 57 they are
instead impartial, neutral declarations 58 of "the law." Within this claim
is a tacit, enormously ambitious notion of law as something with an in-
ternal, objective 9 content, that is discovered or deduced. 6°
57. Cf. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689
(1984) (For Sunstein, "naked preferences" referred to the raw political desires of the majority.
The need to place limits on this potentially tyrannizing force is the raison d'etre of judicial
review. The regime of judicial restraint exists as the conceptual counterweight to this rationale
and is preoccupied with the judicial counterpart to majority tyranny - the tyranny of the
court's own raw political will.).
58. Neutral here means the Court cannot favor A over B, particularly on the basis of
political ideology. The normative source of the command of neutrality is a notion of political
equality between citizens and hence parties. I trace the requirement to the natural law princi-
ples of Locke which perhaps found their most explicit expression in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386 (1798) (Chase, J.):
The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of
the social compact .... An act... contrary to the great first principles of the social
compact[ ] cannot be [law] ... [A] law that takes property from A and gives it to B
... is against all reason and justice.
Id. at 388.
Cf. H. WECHSLER, supra note 56, at 21. For Weschler, "neutrality" was a constraint on
the way decisions were made and lacked normative content. It meant something like "consis-
tency." I see it rather as a notion of the core constitutional value and give it normative content
(L e, it is an antidiscrimination principle at the level of procedure). See also Posner, The Mean-
ing of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1983) ("neutrality" means not only consis-
tent but principled, i.e., can the judge state the real reason for decision truthfully without being
condemned).
59. Law is not only conceived of as an objective quantity, but a physical, solid thing
which has spatial boundaries and material consequences in motion. This notion of law is class-
ically expressed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) F(1824).
(Tihe Court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the laws of New York, as ex-
pounded by the highest tribunal of that state, have... come into collision with an act
of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles him. Should
this collision exist ... the laws of New York must yield....
Id. at 209. Similarly, and more recently, Chief Justice Burger in Tennesse Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978), creates a poetic image of the law as something freestanding, found outside
of the Justices themselves, that if preserved shields everyone.
The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's right. And I'll stick to
what's legal .... I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong... I
can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester
.... What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the devil?
... And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you - where
would you hide Roper, the laws all being flat?... This country's planted thick with
laws from coast to coast.
Id. at 195 (quoting R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEAsoNs, Act I, at 147 (Heinemann ed. 1967).
60. The notion that the law was deduced is of course associated with the formalistic idea.
See, e.g., Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 523 (1988); cf. Posner, supra note 58, at 14
(arguing that formalism is not to be confused with restraint because the Lochner Court was the
ultimate "formalist" while activist in the extreme). Similarly, the Rehnquist Court could
equally be accused of formalism while being extremely activist.
Posner's point only proves the subjectivity and contingency of legal concepts. Formalism
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The rule of stare decisis, that courts should follow the rules laid
down in precedent, is a corollary of the notion that the law is discovered
and not made:
The judges in the several courts of justice... are the depositories of the
laws, the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt ....
Their knowledge of that law is derived... from being long personally
accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors. And indeed
these judicial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evi-
dence... of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law
.... For it is an established rule to abide by former pr3cedents...
because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined,
what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a
permanent rule.
61
Moreover, the notion of objective content62 here is brigaded with the
natural law notion that the principles involved are in a sense eternal and
unchanging - they have not (and do not) become obsolete.
63
It follows that, only by adhering to an equally objective method,
restraining the emotions in favor of a disciplined, dispassionate inquiry,
can this discovery occur.64
This restraint or limitation on method - the way decisions are
made - serves to both create and define the judicial power itself. Under
our constitutionalism, the law is supreme, the guardian of liberty that
keeps each branch of government within the limits of its role.65 The duty
and its controlling assumptions of restraint mean different things to different people at different
times. The Rehnquist and Lochner Courts, which are mirror images of one another, would
both claim that what observers may decry as activism really is no more than the Court
mechanically deducing and applying the unalterable command of law.
61. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 24 (1981) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-
1769, at 379-80 (1979)).
62. Traditionally, the notion of the objectivity of law was quite literal. See supra note 59.
Professor Fiss has defended the notion of constitutional law as objective in an "interpretive"
sense. Under his theory of "bounded objectivity," the law is objective so long as it tracks the
authoritative standards of the proper "interpretive community." See Fiss, Objectivity and In-
terpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 745 (1982).
63. See, e.g., Meese, Address Before the D.C Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyer's
Division, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 25 (S. Levin-
son & S. Mailloux ed. 1988), arguing that the Constitution is ageless in its meaning and intent:
it "is not that the Constitution may be adapted to the various crises of human affairs, but that
legislative powers granted by the Constitution are adaptable to meet these crises." Id. at 28.
64. See Rehnquist, A Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 696-97 (1976); see also
Fiss, supra note 62, at 746 (arguing that judges must conform to fixed standards of the inter-
pretive community of legal scholars or "they lose their right to speak with the authority of
law.").
65. Judicial restraint thus relies centrally upon a strong notion of separation of powers.
See R. POSNER, supra note 61, at 11-14. According to Professor Berns, this notion of an
"independent judiciary" as a check on the legislature derives from Montesquieu's book, Spirit
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of the Court, much like a night watchman, is merely to observe - to
make sure the law is followed. A court without constraints on what it
could decide would be anathema. Without such limits, the Court, under
the guise of declaring the law, could become a super legislature. The will
of the people could be usurped, thwarting the majoritarian process.
66
Judicial restraint rationalizes all this by subordinating substance to
process, by using methodology to cabin power.67 By placing hard limits
on the way a court decides - it must decide neutrally - we, in effect,
limit outcomes.
This works because the operative concept - the notion of neutrality
- shifts the burden of persuasion onto the party seeking to exercise the
Court's power. Because judicial power is so dangerous to the
majoritarian process, the baseline of neutrality is nonaction or noninter-
vention. Hence, movement in any direction is a deviation that not only
must be justified, but justified objectively.
68
The intimate interconnection between what the Court decides and
how it decides it, using neutrality as a conceptual linchpin, is a clever
strategy for maintaining things as they are. The Court remains tethered
to a baseline of inaction that favors the status quo. At the same time,
because there are no direct substantive limitations, claims or discussion
about substantive, much less ideological, limitations are pre-empted.
of the Laws (1748). See Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, Sup. Cr.
REv. 49 (1982).
66. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-29 (1962); J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST 45-48 (1980); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
67. This idea of judicial restraint proceeds from a notion of justice as fairness; a deep,
contractarian proceduralism in which the postulate that the majority decides public values
preempts the question of whether the majority has selected correctly. See J. RAWLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE 1-22 (1971) (Arguing that such a "justice as fairness ideal" would be chosen
by a community beginning from the "original position." Judicial review is possible but only
upon a justification grounded in process norms). See generally J. ELY, supra note 66 (arguing
for a process-norm based theory of judicial review).
68. This focus on "objectivity" flows from the tacit use of "objectivism" as the lens
through which the restraint proponents look at the world. "Objectivism" refers to, inter alia,
the idea that there is a correspondence between the word categories we use and the real world.
On this perspective, "the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects.
There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is.' Truth involves
some kind of correspondence relation between words or thought signs and external things."
HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY 49 (1981).
Many scholars believe that this "objectivism" is a fundamental flaw because "[s]igns do
not intrinsically correspond to objects independently of how those signs are employed and by
whom." Id. at 52; see also Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1131
(1989) (arguing that language provides no objective description of reality separate from our
conceptual schemes.).
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Let us take the seminal issue in public litigation as an example.
Whether to permit school segregation on the basis of race to continue or
to forbid it, if decided purely on the basis of liberal morality, is an easy
question: Of course segregation is wrong. The rub here is what Profes-
sor Bickel called the counter-majoritarian difficulty. 69 Social policy is for
the legislature to shape as representatives of the majority will.70
For the Court to intervene to frustrate the workings of the elected
branches on the basis of social policy is not merely counter-majoritarian
but inherently subjective: Who is to say that the value judgments of the
nine Justices are morally superior - on the issue of segregation or any-
thing else - to those majorities of the particular states who considered
the same social issues but reached different conclusions? 71 And what
check is there in a process of making naked social choices to prevent the
Justices from merely exercising naked preference in disguise.
The only justification for such interference is the narrow positive
ground that the majority has contravened the Constitution, the supreme
law of the land.72 It follows that the way a court must go about the
69. See J. ELY, supra note 66, at 43-48. See also Bork, Neutral Principles and some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1974) ("[O]ne essential premise of the Madisonian
model is majoritarianism... however... [t]here are some things a majority should not do to
us no matter how democratically it decides to do them.").
70. The underlying political conception seems to be a kind of market theory of govern-
ment linked to a premise of political laissez-faire. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 1694. The
ordering of values through the political process is like the market ordering of supply and de-
mand. Within this conception interference seems "mystical, totalitarian." Id.; see also Acker-
man, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989) (arguing that moral
values are unworkable as legal standards because they are indeterminate).
71. This moral skepticism was perhaps most eloquently advocated by Justice Holmes:
Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of many things that
were not so .... What we most love and revere generally is determined by early
associations. I love granite rocks and barberry bushes, no doubt because with them
were my earliest joys that reach back through the past eternity of my life. But while
one's experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of
how they came to be so leaves one able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally
dogmatic about something else.
O.W. HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310, 311 (1920). Several modern
scholars have guarded well Holmes' moral skepticism flame. See Rehnquist, supra note 64, at
704-05. See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 249-82 (1977); R. BORK, supra
note 21, at 252 ("There is no satisfactory explanation of why the judge has authority to impose
his morality on us.").
72. See J. ELY, supra note 66, at 7-9 (arguing that this "value-neutral" model of constitu-
tional "interpretation" has appeal because it supports judicial review while answering the
claim that judicial review is counter to democratic principles of majority rule). "[W]hen a
court strikes down a popular statute as unconstitutional it may [say to the majority]: we didn't
do it - you did." Id. at 9. This view relies on the self-evident fiction that "constitutional
law" exists apart from our own opinions about it. The argument requires us to reify text, to
imagine it as a thing, like a chain or a tie that "binds." Even if one were to accept this fiction,
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critical interpretive business of determining whether constitutional con-
travention has occurred is to follow neutral principles:7" neutral princi-
ples to discipline the interpretive process to insure that the court is
exercising only judgment as opposed to personal preference and political
will.
At the center of the constellation of concepts comprising these neu-
tral principles and rules is the notion that what the Constitution says is
important, not what a particular judge thinks is correct or what he/she
thinks a particular situation demands.
Of course, since the Constitution on individual rights is open-tex-
tured or opaque, this textualism might seem naive.
The classic answer to this problem was that if the text was not clear,
one simply had to determine the "original intent." Whether or not bus-
ing should be ordered to remedy past segregation against blacks as a con-
stitutional question had nothing to do with the urgency of the need, and
again nothing to do with what the judges personally thought was right.
It was, rather, a search, several generations removed, for what the fram-
ers intended the constitutional text to mean with respect to busing
(notwithstanding that when the Constitution was written, there was no
such thing as a bus).
74
This formalism75 of limiting judicial inquiry to the four corners of
the text (and its implicit "intent") was held inviolable even against claims
the problem is that the fiction is incomplete and incoherent as a justification. The text, binding
or not, is extremely unclear. Inevitably, there is a need to turn to some substantive value to fix
constitutional meaning. See Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE LJ. 1063, 1064 (1980).
73. This emphasis on neutrality with regard to public values has been explicitly embraced
by the Rehnquist Court. For example, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), the
Court rejected a challenge to the Kentucky Legislature's choice of the death penalty for 16-
year-olds saying they could not follow their "personal preferences" and strike down the law
because they would then cease to be "judges of the law" but instead a "committee of philoso-
pher Kings." Id. at 2980.
74. This old argument carries the contemporary banner of interpretivism. In its modem
form, the search is not for intent as an actual mental fact, but intent as it "reasonably" appears
from the text and associated historical materials. See R. BORK, supra note 21, at 144. The
idea is not only to ground decisions in something exterior to the judges' own values, but to
connect it in some manner to the original "will." "Non-interpretivists" suggest that courts
should try to identify within the Constitution general public values and then interpret them
contextually. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 228-32 (arguing judges are like authors
of a chain novel, they may write what they like as long as it respects the overall "integrity" of
the work).
75. Formalism can be defined by the way it looks at text. It sees text as a vehicle for an
author's intent. Moreover, there is the romantic notion that the writer's intent is "immortal"
to the ravages of time. Shakespeare's famous Sonnet LXV is the classic statement of the idea:
Since brass, nor stone, nor earth, nor boundless sea,
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that history or social analysis required departures from what was literally
written down. The search across the misty vale of history for this origi-
nal intent was a sacred convention, perhaps the constitutional equivalent
of the search for the Holy Grail.
The formalistic idea resonates with a kind of canonical demand for
order and coherence in court decisions, and implicitly threatens those
liberals who depart from it not merely with heresy, but with an immatur-
ity comparable to a car driver who refuses to observe red lights.
These two overarching commandments - (1) follow what is written
down, and (2) follow the framers' intent - were the alpha and omega of
traditional legal scholars. Together with an implicit concept of law as
positive, and the corollary of stare decisis, these parameters reflected the
stubborn hope of legal conservatives: by narrowing the ambit of what
judges would consider, a conceptual territory could be carved out for law
far removed from the constantly shifting sands of social debate.
From my vantage point, within this elaborate rationalization and
design are patterns of inner conflict going to the root of judges' and law-
yers' anxieties about the need for something upon which to ground their
judgments. Past an uncritical objectivism about language, the true
ground for legal judgment lies not in notions of law as objective and
judges as oracles; rather, it resides within the power of the concept of law
- the power of the Word - to create and structure power relations
between men. I don't mean to suggest an historical conspiracy. There is
But sad mortality o'ersways their power,
How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea,
Whose action is no stronger than a flower?
01 how shall summer's honey breath hold out
Against the wrackful siege of batt'ring days
When rocks impregnable are not so stout,
Nor gates of steel so strong, but Time decays?
O fearful meditation where, alack,
Shall Time's best jewel from Time's chest lie hid?
Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back?
01 none, unless this miracle have might,
That in my black ink my love may still shine bright.
W. SHAKESPEARE, SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS 149 (T. Brooke ed. 1936) (1st ed. 1609).
To this imagery is added the fiction that we can, from our temporal distance, still deter-
mine this intent, and must do so to preserve the integrity of the text. Cf. M. FOUCAULT, What
is An Author? in THE FOUCAULT READER 101-20 (1984) (arguing that the writer being absent
does not really exist for interpretation - he is just a construct). As it seeks to follow original
"authorial" intent, interpretivism is a form of formalism. In law, formalism is generally con-
demned. Cf H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-30 (1961) (defining formalism as
refusal to acknowledge necessity of choice in penumbral area of rules); Tushnet, Anti-Formal-
ism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1506-07 (1985) (formalism as the
artificial narrowing of the range of choices).
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a close connection between the way we are taught to see something, and
the way we observe, between perceived meaning and belief.76 The ulti-
mate power of the metaphor of restraint is that it contains within it
enough of a cognitive model for interpreting the meaning of law, and
judges' roles, that the metaphor blends with fact; one's belief in its corol-
laries blends with one's perception of reality. It is this which perhaps
explains why there is such religiosity about fictional quantities like "orig-
inal intent."
It is this classical conception of the proper ambit of legal interpreta-
tion which, in reconfigured form, is at the center of the Rehnquist Court
approach. Perhaps the best summary, in a sentence, of what I hear the
Rehnquist Court saying occurred in a speech by an erstwhile Reagan Era
politician. Ridiculing those who wanted to look elsewhere than within
the text or the imaginary minds of the framers for the Constitution's
meaning, one Attorney General said, "[T]he further afield interpretation
travels from its point of departure in the text, the greater the danger that
constitutional adjudication will be like a picnic to which the framers
bring the words and the judges bring the meaning."
'77
Ironically, from a review of several of the Rehnquist Court's deci-
sions, it seems that the Court is contradicting itself. In an effort to en-
force restraint, to maintain the neutrality and objectivity of the law in the
face of liberal ideology, they have introduced their own ideology. In
short, it looks as though the picnic that Meese described has already
begun.
II. The White Knight's Inventions
"Now the cleverest thing of the sort that I ever did," he went on
after a pause, "was inventing a new pudding during the meat-course."
"In time to have it cooked for the next course?" said Alice.
"Well, that was quick work certainly!"
"Well, not the next course," the Knight said in a slow, thoughtful
tone, "no, certainly not the next course."
"Then it would have to be the next day. I suppose you wouldn't
have two pudding-courses in one dinner?"
"Well, not the next day," the Knight repeated as before, "not the
next day. In fact," he went on, holding his head down, and his voice
getting lower and lower, "I don't believe that pudding ever was cooked!
76. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 132-36 (G. Anscombe trans.
1953).
77. Meese, supra note 63, at 31.
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In fact, I don't believe that pudding ever will be cooked! And yet it
was a very clever pudding to invent."'78
A. Wards Cove: A Clever Pudding
The Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio79
is a good example of the interpretive picnic the conservatives are having.
In Wards Cove, the Court confronted a discrimination claim in which
there were stark patterns of segregation.80
There were separate dining facilities for whites and nonwhites.81 In
addition, there was "stratification of jobs along racial and ethnic lines." '8 2
Nonwhites comprised 10% of the pool of workers who fit the classifica-
tion of unskilled labor in the general location of the canneries involved.8 3
Nonetheless, over the years of the canneries' operation, they comprised
from 47-70% of the canneries' unskilled laborers. 84 On the other hand,
"virtually all the employees in the major categories of at issue jobs (non-
cannery jobs) were white." 85
The cannery jobs in which nonwhites were concentrated were not
only the least prestigious, they were also the lowest paid. 86 In addition,
cannery workers received the poorest and (mind you, the canneries in
question are located in Alaska) the least insulated housing. 87 The racial
character of the job/housing designation is reinforced by the employers'
own racial labeling in which terms like "Phillipine Bunkhouse" were
used to refer to cannery housing,88 and "native" to refer to certain can-
nery jobs.89
Although there were no express policies preventing minorities from
seeking noncannery jobs, a system of interlocking, discretionary em-
ployer practices locked the racial stratification into place.
78. E. CAHN, CONFRONTING INJUSTICE 70 (1966) (quoting L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS (1896)).
79. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
80. In Wards Cove, the claim arose under Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.
Id. at 2118.
81. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,437, at
33,821 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 6, 1983).
82. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2128 n.4.
83. See Atonio, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 33,828.
84. Id. at 33,829.
85. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2135 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
86. Id. at 2120.
87. See Atonio, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 33,836.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 33,835.
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Nonwhite cannery employees had problems applying for jobs
outside of the cannery. For example, if they applied during the season in
which they were working, they were not considered because the em-
ployer only accepted applications off season.9° Moreover, the vast major-
ity of the minority cannery workers had been recruited locally and were
from Alaska. 91 On the other hand, the employer hired for noncannery
jobs in Seattle, Washington or Astoria, Oregon.
92
Further, there were no posted job vacancies, and no listed job quali-
fications. 93 Nonwhites neither knew when jobs were vacant, nor what
"qualifications" were needed for the job. This was complicated by the
fact that, in many instances, while the employer claimed that certain
noncannery jobs were skilled, this was a subjective label. The jobs often
required skills, but they were skills that could be provided in brief train-
ing.94 The employer provided no training to cannery employees. 95
And there was no formal promotion system. Recruitment for non-
cannery jobs was by word of mouth from incumbent, predominantly
white noncannery workers to their friends and relatives who almost al-
ways were white also.96 Under this system, the overwhelmingly white
noncannery workforce consistently perpetuated itself.
Despite the striking, chronic disparity, and what one Justice went so
far as to call "plantation" style segregation, 97 the Court found no
discrimination.
The decision is complex, but a major part of the rationale has to do
with how this Court, in contrast to its predecessors, defined discrimina-
tion. To understand the turnabout here it is essential to understand the
ongoing theoretical conflict which formed the backdrop to the Court's
approach.
Discrimination, like its conceptual opposite, equality, is a riddle or
paradox which invites conflicting interpretations. The interpretations
differ, interestingly, in their respective conceptions of the underlying
90. Id. at 33,837.
91. Id. at 33,828.
92. Id. at 33,827.
93. Id.
94. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2135 n.26 (1989).
95. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,437, at
33,830.
96. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2135 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. "Some characteristics of the Alaska salmon industry described in this litigation - in
particular, the segregation of housing and dining facilities and the stratification of jobs along
racial and ethnic lines - bear an unsettling resemblance to aspects of a plantation economy."
Id. at 2128 n.4.
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moral principle upon which the norm of equality is based.98 For the
conservatives, the antidiscrimination laws merely enact a procedural
principle commanding that, in employment decisions, like must be
treated alike.99
Because the nondiscrimination notion is a procedural concept assur-
ing evenhanded treatment of similarly situated individuals, it is breached
when similarly situated individuals are treated differently because of their
race. Such differential treatment has an essential ingredient of volition,
and a finding of unconstitutional discrimination therefore rests on a find-
ing of intent.10°
Thus, the focus on employer decisions is determined by how the
discrimination or the antidiscrimination principle is defined: The ques-
tion of discrimination is always whether employer decisions are even-
handed or not.101 Since by definition discrimination involves employer
decisions that involve intentional conduct, it would make no sense to talk
about discrimination other than as an intentional construct.
This definitional linkage of discrimination with intentional conduct
is associated with a concomitant notion of discrimination as a particular-
ized wrong. 102
That is, the traditional view posits discrete individual actors and dis-
crete actions which have legal meaning only when associated with an
intentional element. 103 Within the definition of discrimination as an in-
tentional act of particular individuals is a model of discrimination as
something akin to an intentional tort. Thus, historical or social inquiry
in these terms seems mystical and irrelevant.
A corollary of the definition of discrimination as an intentional con-
struct is that the goal of discrimination law is to identify instances in
98. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1970-1971)
(presenting the seminal insight that there are two competing moral norms within the concept
of equality).
99. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). As Westen
points out, the rule begs the question: "When are two people sufficiently alike?" The indeter-
minacy of the rule collapses it into a search for some substantive principle on which to ground
results.
100. Blumstein, Defining Discrimination: Intent v. Impact, 16 NEW PERSP. 29, 33 (1984).
101. This image of the "evenhanded" employer is perhaps the key cognitive device which
allows us to conceptualize the principle of antidiscrimination within the intent or disparate
treatment model. The image contains the operative metaphor that equality exists where there
is balance. A scale is balanced when its two "hands" are level or "even" with one another.
Similarly, employers pursue "equality" when they are "evenhanded."
102. There is an implicit metaphor of discrimination being a kind of assault.
103. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (arguing
this represents "the perpetrator perspective").
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which wrongful intent is expressed. As Professor Freeman points out,
this presumes that intentional wrongdoing is not the norm.
From this perspective, the law views racial discrimination not as a
social phenomenon, but merely as the misguided conduct of particular
actors. It is a world where, but for the conduct of these misguided ones,
the system of equality of opportunity would work. 
°4
This presumption of discrimination as deviant creates a class of in-
nocents, the majority of whom are not at fault.105
To protect the innocent as it were, to provide the necessary reliabil-
ity of the inquiry, this notion of discrimination as an intentional act (L e.,
an intentional tort) was brigaded with tort-based notions of causation.'°6
Thus, under the traditional view, the plaintiff must show a tort-modeled
causal nexus between the defendant's intentional consideration of race
and the loss of some employment benefit.
The effect of the imposition of the baselines on the discrimination
concept, natural as it may seem, is to narrow the idea to a legalism so
cramped and artificial that it excludes whole categories of race-based dis-
parities from legal purview.
10 7
However, a broader view would see the "like should be treated
alike" approach as a Procrustean bed in which actual victims are penal-
ized because their circumstances do not fit narrow preconceptions. This
broader view would define the antidiscrimination principle as premised
on the notion that, where a person has an immutable characteristic, that
104. Id. at 1054.
105. Id. at 1055. "The fault notion as applied to racial discrimination today is... related
to the assumption of 50's liberals that such discrimination was largely a Southern problem."
Id.
106. See G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 61-68 (1980). Most of
our ordinary conceptual system is generalized from our physical experience. We conceptualize
causation based on our experiences as children in manipulating objects "[we] pull off [our]
blankets, throw our bottles, drop toys." Id. at 70.
We generalize from these experiences a prototype of what causation is. This generaliza-
tion "is a mental construct by which the human mind creates meaning, a recurring structure or
repeatable pattern that is the chief means for achieving order in our experience so that we can
comprehend it and reason about it." Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between
Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2231 (1989). The "prototypical"
notion of causation is that a single specific person or agent causes something, there is a plan, it
has a specific effect, and the effect is perceptible. See G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra, at 69-
72 (the operative notion of causation in discrimination law tracks the cognitive "prototype").
107. See Lawrence, supra note 22, at 321-44 (noting that intent based theories fail to rec-
ognize that unequal treatment often results from unconscious processes (e.g., racial stereotyp-
ing)); see also Fiss, supra note 98, at 251 (arguing that unequal treatment may result from
mistaken "information" about race).
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person may not be burdened or penalized unnecessarily because of that
characteristic. 08
The operative image is a notion of equality as a path. Discrimina-
tion is a "barrier" which prevents minorities from advancing along the
path.
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute....
•.. What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers oper-
ate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification. 1o9
The atomistic, procedural concept of discrimination that focuses
discretely upon particular employment decisions (the intent model) is re-
placed by a broad substantive vision of removing the obstacles that block
racial progress." 10
Under this concept of discrimination, the good faith or bad faith of
the employer is irrelevant. The intractable inquiry about the acceptabil-
ity of an employer's mental state is supplanted by the question of the
acceptability of the social result of an employer's decisions. We move
from an inward, subjective inquiry to an outward, objective approach.
Moreover, we move forward in time from a nineteenth century tort
model of discrimination, linked and intertwined with classical notions of
individual fault/responsibility, to a more contemporary sense of group or
social responsibility.
This conception of discrimination, which animated the Court in
Griggs, is called the effects model."' Under this approach, the question
is one of acceptability of policies which have disparate effects. By dispa-
108. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part). "While a classification is not per se invalid because it
divides classes on the basis of an immutable characteristic (citation omitted)... such divisions
are contrary to our deep belief that 'legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing.'" Id. (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972) (emphasis in original).
109. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971).
110. The two schools of thought, intent vs. effects, use different theories of meaning. The
intent school thinks of the word discrimination as referential: it refers to text, to specifically
identifiable decisions, specifically identifiable economic injuries, etc. The effects school thinks
of word discrimination as the skin of a grand idea. Discrimination encompasses the ideal of a
racially just society in truth as well as form. On the contrast between referential and idealistic
theories of meaning, see generally L. WIrrGENSTEIN, supra note 76.
111. Thus, I distinguish between "intent and effects." Cf. Fiss, School Desegregation: The
Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 3, 3-4 (1974) (differentiating between discrim-
ination as a "process" and "pattern"); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreward: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976) (distinguishing be-
tween "process" and "result"); Gerwitz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the
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rate effect we mean, for example, a high school diploma requirement
which impacts unequally on blacks and whites." 12
It is true that such a high school diploma requirement is facially
neutral. However, because the high school diploma requirement has dis-
parate effects, it nonetheless falls within the ambit of the discrimination
concept. This concept of discrimination relies upon an understanding of
discrimination as an historical or social problem. 113 If blacks by law,
because of the immutable characteristic of race, have been denied equal
access to education, then it is unfair to burden them with requirements
which penalize them for that de jure segregation.
Thus, through the lens of the Griggs antidiscrimination principle,
educational requirements, e.g., high school diploma requirements, which
disproportionately exclude blacks are presumptively discriminatory and
illegal.
The evidentiary policy of a discrimination case mirrors the concep-
tual framework. Because the disparate effect is an evil to be eliminated,
the burden is placed on the employer to show that these educational re-
quirements, which have disproportionately excluded blacks, are justified
by business necessity."14
The two concepts of discrimination can be separated along the line
which divides formal as opposed to real equality. The formal equality
approach is a conservative approach adopted, perhaps uncritically, as the
Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 729 (1986) (differentiating between "purposeful
discrimination" and "disadvantage").
112. This classic disparity obtained in Griggs. In Griggs, according to the 1960 census
data, 34% of white males in North Carolina had completed high school as compared with
12% of black males. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
113. Thus, the two schools of thought, intent vs. effects, use different methods of inquiry.
The intent school has its roots in formalism and looks essentially at text and legislative history.
The effects school has its roots in antiformalism and considers history and social context. Said
another way, the intent school grows out of the formal common law tradition while the effects
school grows out of the antiformal tradition that begins with Brown.
114. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. See also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (test
which had disparate impact on blacks could not be justified by employer's good faith effort to
cure disproportionate exclusion of blacks through subsequent affirmative action program);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight standards which had disparate
impact on women could not be justified by bald, uncorroborated assertion that "a sufficient but
unspecified amount of [strength] is essential to effective job performance as correctional coun-
selor."). But see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (discussed infra);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (only if the minorities could identify
a causal relationship between disproportionate exclusion and the specific component of the
selection test that excluded them would the employer have the burden of justifying the dispro-
portionate number of minorities in the lower echelons of the workforce hierarchy).
Fall 1990] AN ELEGY FOR DREAMS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
predominant theme and slogan of the civil rights movement. 115 This for-
mal equality approach seeks a color-blind society, and claims only equal-
ity of opportunity. Resonating with biblical simplicity," 6 it can be
accommodated within a traditional legal framework because it makes no
distributive claim and does not disrupt or threaten existing institutions or
economic relationships. The difficulty with this approach is that, to its
critics, it falls short both as social policy and as a response to legislative
will. Critics argue that it fails to address problems Congress intended to
focus on in its enactment of civil rights laws.' 1 7
On the other hand, the real equality approach is, in its most pure
and extreme form, redistributive and demands that the law speak to con-
tinuing, chronic inequalities. Within its moral claim, there is an echo of
the historic demand, enunciated by the Radical Republicans, that the law
exorcise from the body politic of this country the "demon of race."'"18
The real equality approach begins doctrinally as an idea embedded in
Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, in which Harlan seeks
to look beyond the text to the true meaning of equality. 19 It becomes a
tacit guiding ideal for the liberal wing of the Court in Brown, which is
unmistakably the doctrinal ancestor of Griggs. The real equality ap-
proach underlies affirmative action claims as well as those challenging
disproportionate effects.'
20
Although the underlying moral claim of the real equality approach
is compelling, it is problematic as a legal theory in that its distributive
aspect conflicts with classical notions of individual rights: one cannot be
115. The great theme of the civil rights movement was to assert the moral sameness of all,
arguing the irrelevance of color. See, e.g., M.L. KING, STRENGTH TO LOVE 35-37 (1963).
116. See Leviticus, supra note 4.
117. In Griggs, the Court argued that in Title VII, Congress saw discrimination as effect.
401 U.S. at 430-31. But see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and
the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 67-68 (1972) (suggesting
that at the time the prevailing view saw discrimination as an intentional act).
118. This imagery is fashioned after the language of reconstruction which depicted the
institution of slavery as a "monster." See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142
(1865).
119. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). "[The Thir-
teenth Amendment... did something more than to prohibit slavery... it established... civil
freedom throughout the United States." Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). It is the affirmative
character of civil rights, and the notion that these rights expressed ideals (like freedom) which
are the core elements of the real equality notion. This is clearly Harlan's model.
120. This approach contrasts with the doctrine expressed in a number of cases prior to
Wards Cove. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Univer-
sity of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In both cases, the conservative point was
that minorities were seeking something more from the law than identifying and remedying
intentional violations of law.
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held liable outside of traditional, tort-based notions of fault. 121 The bal-
ance between these two competing ideas of equality was set by rules
which limited the intent model to cases in which individual employment
decisions were involved.122
However, where facially neutral employment standards or require-
ments were being challenged as unnecessary barriers, there was a general
consensus that the effects model applied. Typically, these standards or
requirements or tests were in writing and represented formal policy.
They were typically, also, objective standards or requirements in the
sense that they applied mechanically, across the board. For example, the
high school diploma requirement was an objective qualification in the
sense that everyone was subject to the same requirement, and it was read-
ily determinable whether one had the credential or not.
In Wards Cove, however, the Court confronted a fact situation
which was located on or near the dividing line between the two concep-
tions of equality. The minorities were purporting to challenge subjective
requirements and standards. Because there was an ostensible challenge
to facially neutral standards, the effects model was applicable on its face.
However, because there was an element of subjectivity, there was the
argument that the claim was really one that fit the model of intentional
decision-making.123 The civil rights community awaited with a hush for
the answer to the question before the Court: Which model would apply?
The Court decided that the effects model was applicable agreeing,
one would think, to the approach implicit in the theory. However, while
they kept the title, they changed the song: The Court grafted onto a
nominal effects approach a concept of discrimination and a method of
analysis directly contrary to the goals and values of that theory. 24 In a
word, "disparate impact" is redefined.
Under the Court's disparate impact approach, showing a causal
nexus between misconduct and racial exclusion, and ultimately identify-
ing intentional employer misconduct, becomes all-important. Con-
versely, the sheer "effect" of a subjective selection system to perpetuate
de facto racial stratification becomes irrelevant.
The Court integrated this intentionalist model of discrimination into
its "impact" formula by conflating the requirement of a showing of ad-
verse impact with a showing of intent. The trick here was to lift the
121. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 103, at 1054-55.
122. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
123. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2120 n.4. (1989).
124. Id. at 2127-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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phrase "otherwise-qualified" from the Griggs model, where it had one
meaning, and transpose it into the Court's new vocabulary, where it took
on a very different meaning.
In both cases, "otherwise-qualified" refers to where, or upon whom,
the axe of judicial presumption falls. In Griggs, "otherwise-qualified"
was associated with two assumptions. First, that races were equal in abil-
ity. Second, that if blacks were being excluded due to qualifications, the
qualifications were presumptively unnecessary and bad. Of course, in
Griggs, the jobs were unskilled. 125
In Wards Cove, the Court stated that the mere fact of a statistical
disparity between a minority percentage of the employer workforce and
their presence in skilled jobs did not make out a prima facie showing of
adverse impact. It was not probative because it was not clear that minor-
ities as a group were "otherwise-qualified." 1 26 Assumptions about racial
parity are replaced with a deep skepticism about skill parity between
whites and nonwhites as groups. The term "otherwise-qualified" now
carries with it this baggage of "racial skepticism."
It follows that in Wards Cove, the Court assumed that employer
skill requirements are necessary and good, completely inverting the as-
sumptions of Griggs. The Court went on to shift the burden to the plain-
tiffs to show that, despite their qualifications, they are being
disproportionately denied the employment benefits they seek. This famil-
iar strategy of comparing the qualified minority applicant pool with those
hired is the classic Hazelwood/Teamsters127 formula for proving sys-
125. Griggs is to Wards Cove what Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1 (1971), is to Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). In employment segregation, as
in school segregation, the Court draws a line between two contexts: the primitive Southern
context in which blacks have been expressly excluded, and the more subtle Northern context in
which there has been no express exclusion. In both Griggs and Swann, the Court read the
pattern of segregation against its sense of southerners being primitive, deviationist, and bad on
issues of race. But in both Wards Cove and Keyes, the Court assumes they are dealing with
modern, normal, and good institutions. In the employment cases, however, the good/bad di-
chotomy turns less on geography (North vs. South) than it does on a notion of taint associated
with certain kinds of tests.
In Griggs, the employer imposes, inter alia, a requirement that blacks prove they could
pass a pencil and paper test before they could have certain jobs. Such a requirement is tainted
by resemblance to classic Southern exclusionary devices, such as requiring blacks to prove they
can read before they can vote. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
An effects approach was justified in Griggs to bring deviationist southerners or Southern style
means of racial exclusion to heel. However, once we move away from unskilled jobs, and from
the classic Southern exclusionary device of pencil and paper tests, we move away from the
taint of the Southern paradigm and the need for the effects model.
126. Wards Cove,'109 S. Ct. at 2121 (quoting New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979)).
127. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of
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temic, intentional discrimination. In effect, to establish that they are
"otherwise-qualified," minorities must go through the same evidentiary
sequence required to prove intent.
The point is that patterns of de facto segregation now lack legal
meaning in themselves, and are relevant only insofar as they are circum-
stantial evidence of a discriminatory state of mind.
The notion of causation is given its strict, particularizing spin. The
selection process had a number of components - informal recruitment
practices; subjective job qualifications; and informal, standardless promo-
tion practices. The Supreme Court required that the minorities identify a
causal nexus between the specific employment practice involved, and the
disparity of advancement or employment of which they complained. The
sheer informality of the process virtually assured that no such tracking
was possible.
Discrimination for this Court - even under the effects model -
meant something specific, intentional, and discrete. Like a common law
tort, it involved a specific identifiable cause, and identifiable actors. Be-
cause, among other problems, the Aleuts and Filipinos could not come
up with facts tracking these common law tort baselines, they lost.
Through its linking of the effects theory of discrimination with an
antithetical intentionalist model of causation, the Court has erased the
boundaries between the two competing concepts of equality, and col-
lapsed the two concepts into one.
The label of disparate impact, and Griggs as a disparate impact case,
remain, but the content of each is redefined according to an intentionalist
view of what discrimination is. The Wards Cove opinion is, in fact, an
unfolding of the Court's concept of the goal of discrimination law to
identify and remedy intentional violations only. Said another way, racial
exclusion, no matter how disproportionate or chronic, in the absence of a
showing of intent, becomes inconceivable as an actionable wrong. 128 The
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Between them, these cases set forth the
formula for making statistical comparisons in a systemic disparate treatment case.
128. This fault model conception of discrimination is buttressed by the Court's presupposi-
tion that discrimination refers exclusively to legal as opposed to moral discourse. It follows
that the very grammar or inherent rules of legal discourse work to exclude untraditional con-
ceptions of equality:
The peculiarity of legal discourse is that it tends to constrain the political imagina-
tion and to induce belief that our evolving social arrangements and institutions are
just and rational, or at least inevitable, and therefore legitimate .... It is, in short,
the vocation of legal thought to render radical, nonliberal visions of freedom literally
inconceivable.
Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982).
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Court feels neither the need, nor the freedom, to address broad social or
moral issues, to try to eradicate caste, or to try to actually eradicate
discrimination.
There is, I think, a single concept that unites the Court's relentless
insistence on intent as a boundary for the discrimination concept and
positive analysis, as opposed to moral inquiry, as a boundary for inter-
pretation: The Court is tracking a notion of neutrality.
This detached approach prompted one Justice to ask "whether the
majority still believes that race discrimination - or, more accurately,
race discrimination against nonwhites - is a problem in our society, or
even remembers that it ever was."' 129
From an internal standpoint, the Court is still being neutral. But
this is so only through an ideological lens' 30 in which there is only one
way to define discrimination and its goals.13 ' The Court has adopted an
implicit God's eye view of equality. And in so doing, it has imposed its
own values and beliefs about the social world. 132
B. Croson: "They Shall Not Passl"
Similarly, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' 33 the Court in-
validated an affirmative action plan through the partisan constraints it
placed on the concept of discrimination and the interpretive methodol-
ogy that may be used.
In Croson, the city of Richmond, ironically the capital of the old
Confederacy, had enacted into law a minority set-aside program.
Croson, a white subcontractor, challenged this pla as discriminatory on
the basis of race.' 34 Under the set-aside plan, prime contractors to whom
the city awarded construction contracts had to subcontract at least 30%
of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more minority business
enterprises ("MBEs"). 135
129. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. "Nothing but ideology keeps alternative political theories and values, and the people
they represent, out of the discourse defining the legal rules by which persons and institutions
resolve conflicts and determine social winners and losers." Casebeer, Running on Empty: Jus-
tice Brennan's Plea, the Empty State, the City of Richmond, and the Profession, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 989, 993 (1989).
131. This represents, of course, an objectivism about what discrimination is. See supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
132. See G. LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS 301-02 (1987) ("The be-
lief that there is a God's eye point of view that one has access to ... virtually precludes
objectivity ... to be objective requires one to be a relativist of an appropriate sort.").
133. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
134. Id. at 716.
135. Id. at 712.
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At the time the plan was enacted, minorities comprised 50% of the
general population of Richmond, but only .67% of the city's prime con-
struction contracts.' 36 Moreover, at the time, the controlling case was
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 37 in which the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a federal law requiring that at least 10% of federal funds
granted for local public works projects must be used to procure services
from MBEs. 38
Notably, the Burger Court in Fullilove approved a similar federal
set-aside program, in the absence of any specific factual findings of past
discrimination.' 3 9 (Congress had before it no study which was probative
of the issue of whether qualified minorities were excluded from con-
tracting because of their status as minorities.)
On the contrary, instead of focusing on whether there were specific
facts showing discrimination against minority contractors as a discrete
group, a necessary predicate for relief under the classical intent model,
the Court explicitly embraced the notion that Congress could deem a
certain status quo as per se unacceptable. If found unacceptable, the rea-
soning went, Congress had the right and power to try to correct it:
"Although the Act recites no preambulary 'findings' on the subject, we
are satisfied that Congress had abundant historical basis from which it
could conclude that traditional procurement practices, when applied to
minority businesses, could perpetuate the effects of prior discrimina-
tion." 40 Like its doctrinal ancestor, Brown v. Board of Education, the
Court engaged in no noticeable means/ends analysis.' 4'
This makes perfect sense if we understand the implicit framework
the Court adopted: because the Burger Court had consciously chosen
the effects model as its analytical starting point, the focus was on the
results and not on fault or causation. Thus, it was sufficient that black
exclusion from contracting was a vicious cycle, and irrelevant that Con-
gress had not shown, as the intent model would require, a factual nexus
between this continuing exclusion and some prohibited, intentional
conduct.
Having already weighed affirmative action in the definitional bal-
ance, and having found it acceptable, the Burger Court translated that
decision into a standard of review. The Court held that an affirmative
136. Id. at 714.
137. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
138. 154.
139. Id. at 485-86.
140. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
Fall 1990] AN ELEGY FOR DREAMS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
action program of the kind at issue should be judged by the open-ended
test: "whether the objectives of the legislation are within the power of
Congress... [and] whether the limited use of [race] is a constitutionally
permissible means for achieving the ... objectives."1 42 , The set asides
were, of course, upheld.
In Croson, however, the Court begins by expressly rejecting societal
discrimination as a justification for affirmative action. 43 The Fullilove
Court felt that de facto segregation, measured through the grand lens of
history, was sufficient. But the Court in Croson felt that an identifiable
pattern of intentional discrimination'" was required as the initial hurdle
to be overcome.145
In doctrinal terms, this requirement of a showing of particularized
prior discrimination flows from the Court's assessment that the Rich-
mond set-aside program was guilty of race discrimination. As such, it
triggered a strict scrutiny analysis. 46 Strict scrutiny was originally ratio-
nalized under the theory that "discrete, insular minorities" needed spe-
cial protection.' 47 Interestingly, Justice O'Connor held whites to be
discrete and insular in Richmond, even though they were 50% of the
population.
48
But if we peel away the surface, doctrinal explanation, the reason
"societal discrimination" is ignored has to do with the interpretive
boundaries set by the Rehnquist Court. In place of historical back-
ground, the Court substitutes the dry, abstract, and, indeed, white back-
ground of pure legalism. The background for the Court is the fault
model and its parameters of intent and causation.
Discrimination that does not fit these parameters either doesn't exist
or the law, majestically, cannot properly take notice of it. 149
142. Id. at 473 (emphasis in original).
143. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 708 (1989). Societal discrimi-
nation was the tightly packed notion that connotes a linkage between the present exclusion of
blacks and their history and experience: A unique experience that includes slavery, disen-
franchisement, and Jim Crow.
144. The Court seems to require a statistical showing of racial exclusion by either the city
or contractors within the industry in the relevant labor market area. Id. at 729.
145. Id. at 720.
146. Id.
147. See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 154 n.4 (1939). See also Acker-
man, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
148. See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 54 (criticizing the opinion on this point).
149. There is a tacit suggestion that historical inequalities are matters of fate. See Brest,
Antidiscrimination Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1978):
I believe that an individual's moral claim to compensation loses force as the nature,
extent, and consequences of the wrongs inflicted become harder to identify and as the
wrongs recede into the past ... Indeed, as claims to compensation based on past
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This cramped definition of discrimination redefines equality to be
formal only, excluding any notion of real equality. The idea or promise
of real equality, the source of legislative strategy in Fullilove, was to go
beyond the fault model and merely "identifying" intentional discrimina-
tion. It was to provide a remedy which, to some extent, redistributes
opportunities. Otherwise, how can society close the yawning gap be-
tween black and white opportunities in the real world?
Under the Croson model this is turned upside down.
Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking
action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its juris-
diction. If the City of Richmond had evidence before it that non-mi-
nority contractors were systematically excluding minority businesses
from subcontracting opportunities, it could take action to end the dis-
criminatory exclusion. 150
and
Where there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of
qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular
service and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the
locality or the locality's prime contractors, an inference of discrimina-
tory exclusion could arise. 15
Students of Title VII litigation will immediately recognize this again
as the Hazelwood/Teamsters formula for proving the prima facie exist-
ence of a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination. The diffi-
culty with this as a practical or meaningful approach is that, by
definition, if minorities can establish this statistical case of discrimina-
tion, they can go into court and get the relief they want. In defining
discrimination in its ahistorical, particularized way, the Court has thus
so narrowed the notion of discrimination that the predicate for "affirma-
tive action" is an absurdly redundant mirror image of the predicate for
establishing liability in a lawsuit under Title VII.
From the interpretive vantage point of the Court, formal equality
marks the boundary of its normative world. Under the Court's regime of
formal equality, there is no constitutional problem if blacks in over-
whelming disproportion do not participate in the market. This is true
even if their disproportionate absence is, in a general historical sense,
traceable to societal discrimination. It becomes, in the distorting half-
injustices of human institutions become attenuated, they begin to compete with
claims based on the vagaries of fate, and thus become indistinguishable from de-
mands for greater distributive justice among all individuals ....
Id.
150. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 729.
151. Id.
Fall 1990)
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
light of the Court's common law baselines, a speculative wrong: How do
we know intentional discrimination is the cause of the exclusion?
52
Moreover, even if we were convinced that there is an historical
linkage to racial discrimination generally, unless we can trace it to at
least a specific institutional wrongdoer - the construction industry in
Richmond, for example - it now becomes not a speculative wrong but
simply an unrightable one.
Similarly, having cabined the definition of equality to a formalism,
reciprocal redefinitions occur with respect to the elements of the discrim-
ination idea. The operative concept of causation under the Fulliove
framework was social, forward looking: Was the present state of affairs
likely to perpetuate itself? On the other hand, Croson gave causation a
meaning which was legalistic and backward looking, ie., was there iden-
tified past discrimination? Also, in Fullilove, notions of right referred to
group rights - there is a need to try to make good on the "century-old
promise of equality."' 53 In Croson, the word right now refers to narrow,
classical conceptions of individual rights - one cannot impose burdens
on individuals without, in the sense of the common law of torts, showing
fault on the part of identifiable wrongdoers.1 5
4
Operating at the linguistic level, Croson reverses the analytical start-
ing point from an effects model to an intent model (from "real equality"
to formal equality), and reverses the normative framework from a group
model to an individual rights model.
The Court tacitly recognizes the tension between Fullilove and its
instant holding. The Court rationalizes this tension via a preposterous
distinction based on the governmental level involved.1 55 In Fullilove, it
was Congress who was acting; in Croson, it was a city council. Congress
152. Professor Casebeer attributes the City of Richmond's relentless insistence on intent to
a tacit theory of the state. He argues the Court proceeds from a simplistic image of govern-
ment as an entity empty of all but the intentions of its officials. See Casebeer, supra note 130,
at 1003.
153. Specifically, the Court spoke of "remedial efforts directed toward the deliverance of
the century-old promise of equality of economic opportunity." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 463.
154. There is an implicit rhetoric of not punishing the innocent: the Court took pains to
depict Croson as a businessman who did his best, in vain, to find qualified black subs but found
himself enmeshed in the irrebuttable racial presumptions of a minority set-aside program. See
Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 712-16.
The Court here echoed Powell's reference in Wygant v. Jackson, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) to
"legal remedies that work against innocent people." Id. at 276 (emphasis in original). See
Freeman, supra note 103 (attributing such claims of innocence to the perpetrator perspective).
See also Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 398 (1989) (suggesting this
obscures "the obvious advantage that we ... have enjoyed by the oppression of others").
155. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 718.
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had broad power under section five of the fourteenth amendment (herein-
after "Section Five") to enforce the equal protection clause, while the
city council did not.
156
What the appellant in Croson ignores is that Congress, unlike any state
or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to en-
force the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment... that Congress
may ... redress the effects of society-wide discrimination does not
mean that ... the states ... are free [to do so]. 157
The claimed fear was that to allow states to engage in the fashioning
of remedies would somehow frustrate the framer's intent of putting
"clear limits on the States' use of race."158
The Court legitimatizes the "race neutral" constraints it places on
the concept of equality by equating this "race neutral" notion with origi-
nal intent.159
But the coherence of the Court's claim to originalism is belied by the
grotesque shape in which it twists history and the fourteenth amend-
ment. The fourteenth amendment was passed specifically to address the
problems of freed blacks. As Justice Marshall has noted, it seems more
than a little ironic that, through an intentionalist rationale, an amend-
ment so pregnant with congressional intention to help blacks would be
interpreted to foreclose that help. 16 It is simply a revision of history to
contend that Congress meant to do that.
Moreover, implicit in the Court's arguments about Section Five as a
bar to states trying to help blacks is a peculiar interpretive constraint:
156. Justice O'Connor viewed section one of the fourteenth amendment as "an explicit
constraint on state power." I. at 719 (emphasis in original). The fourteenth amendment
reads in pertinent part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they re-
side. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
157. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719.
158. Id.
159. In the Court's view, the ultimate goal of equal protection is to "eliminatfe] entirely
from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's race." Id. at
722.
160. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978).
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the Court privileges a positive dialogue about power over a normative
dialogue about rights.
The Court's tack here is again rhetorical: it conceives of discrimina-
tion as a "remedial model" sending us to an inquiry about the parameters
of the remedial concept. One parameter is "who" has the power to grant
the relief sought. Thus, for the Court, the prior question is the positive
question of who has the authority to provide a remedy, not whether a
wrong exists. Similarly, if one has the power to grant some remedy, one
must still inquire what is the proper "scope" of that remedy.
The normative claims about racial exclusion are entirely circum-
scribed by positive jurisdictional constraints. These remedial-only "posi-
tive law" constraints on equality feed back into the Court's baselines in
the fault model. There is an intricate interdependence between the dis-
course of discrimination as a conception of "law" and "legal remedies,"
and the discourse of discrimination as a conception of particularizing no-
tions of fault.' 6' Although the states retain some power to ameliorate
racial disparities, they are limited to "remedying" particularized past dis-
crimination. Its proper scope, according to the Court, is to make whole
identified victims of discrimination.
Under the remedial concept of discrimination, the requirement of
particularization impinges from both the top and the bottom tiers of
equal protection analysis. To satisfy the compelling state interest, one
needs to identify a discrete class of victims of intentional discrimination.
Then, having particularized the class of victims, the least restrictive alter-
native thus becomes granting relief to members of that particular class.
[S]uch programs [limited to actual victims] are less problematic from
an equal protection standpoint because they treat all candidates indi-
vidually, rather than making the color of an applicant's skin the sole
161. Stretched out on a syllogistic frame the argument seems to be:
1. Remedies are coterminous with common law baselines.
2. Rights are coterminous with remedies.
3. "Discrimination" is a "right."
4. Therefore discrimination is coterminous with common law baselines.
The power of this argument is that it is mechanically deductive and flows easily from the
major premise about the limits of remedies. Its deductive character gives it a thin patina of
"objectivity." It is, of course, based on the arbitrary and perhaps blinding assumption that the
starting point is an inquiry about the positive bounds of "remedies" rather than an inquiry
about the moral expansiveness of rights. In my view, because the Court uses this blinding
assumption as a starting point, it cannot "see" what discrimination is.
An underlying problem is the Court's blinding assumptions about the nature of law. The
Court thinks of law as a "jurisprudence of concepts." "A jurisprudence of concepts is one
which attempts to treat the law as a closed system of definitions, rules of operation, and sub-
stantive major premises such that any specific legal problem can be solved by deductive reason-
ing .... " See W. HAMRICK, supra note 3, at 129.
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relevant consideration . . . [g]iven the existence of an individualized
procedure the city's only interest in maintaining a quota system ... is
administrative convenience.
162
It goes without saying that administrative convenience is not
enough. Hence, a quota will never be either necessary or the least restric-
tive alternative.
Affirmative action comes to mean its opposite: standard judicial
remedy or mere negative prohibition. The difficulty is that, after approx-
imately twenty-five years of testing, mere negative remedies have not
worked to close the gap in black participation. 163
In the real world, to a real society, to both blacks and whites, this
gap is destructive. It breeds notions of caste with all the attendant
stigma; it provides an economic foothold for political inequality; and, to
the extent it does this, it threatens the legitimacy of any claim to true
democracy. In the real world, and in a constitutional as well as a philo-
sophical sense, we are wrapped in the same garment of destiny. But the
Court's sources of perception are limited to the world of legal forms. As
such, neither real equality nor the real world problems of caste, stigma,
and institutional erosion can be coherently conceptualized.
The systematicity of the Court's rhetorical assault could only come
from an intense determination to protect moral values the Court feels is
essential. It clearly sees within the legal text a moral one. Yet, from the
Court's internal point of view, it is not imposing its own preferences: by
protecting these values, it is merely maintaining an objective, neutral
legal framework.
In the struggle of the Rehnquist Court to "protect" its perceived
"neutral" values, the meaning of equality becomes a contested battlefield.
Interpretation becomes war. The liberals who would impose a racial
quota become an ideological insurgency who threaten not merely the in-
nocent, but the very premises of the legal order. They must be stopped,
alas. The cry resounds, "They shall not pass!"
162. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 728-29 (1989).
163. As recently as 1985, Derrick Bell noted that 4 million of 8.8 million black men be-
tween the ages of 16 and 64 are either unemployed, out of the labor force, in prison, or of
undetermined status in the labor force. See Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1985). See also Luban, The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2152, 2160 (1989) (the percentage of black families below the poverty line is 32.4%, for whites
it is 9.7%); Clark, supra note 6, at 808 (since 1969, the percentage of black men who earn less
than $5,000.00 a year rose from 8% to 20%); R. FARLEY & W. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE
AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA 304 (1987) ("Racial differences in relative incomes
hardly vary by how long men attend school... The more years a black man spends in school,
the further his purchasing power falls behind his white peers.").
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C. Patterson: The Invisible Ideal
Blacks: The time has arrived when we, like huntsmen, should
surround the cover, and look sharp that equality does not steal away,
and pass out of sight and escape us. For beyond a doubt she is some-
where in this country: Watch therefore and strive to catch sight of her,
and if you see her first let me know.
The Court: Would that I could! But you should regard me rather
as a hunter who has just eyes enough to see what you show him - that
is about as much as I am good for. 64
Perhaps the best example of the Court's current approach in civil
rights cases is Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.165 In Patterson, a black
woman employed as a teller and a file coordinator complained that she
had been passed over for promotion, made to sweep floors and other me-
nial tasks, and subjected to remarks about black workers being slower
than white workers, all because of her race.' 66 The question actually
raised by the case was whether the statute she used to get into court, 42
U.S.C. § 1981,167 applied to matters after the initial making of the con-
tract. While the issue had not been raised by either litigant, the Court
requested that both sides brief the question of whether or not the Warren
Court's decision in Runyon v. McCrary 168 was still good law. This was
something of an irregular request; without being asked, the Court de-
cided to question the validity of its own precedent.
After some controversy over this boldness, the Court let its own
precedent stand and addressed the question raised. The Court noted that
the words of the statute did in fact say that blacks shall have the same
164. See PLATO, supra note 17, at 146. This is a paraphrase of the dialogue between Soc-
rates and Glaucon.
165. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
166. Id. at 2369, 2373.
167. The statute reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactations of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
168. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). In Runyon, the Court held that section
1981 prohibited private schools from excluding qualified applicants for admission on the basis
of race. The original debate over Runyon arises largely from Justice White's contentions about
section 1981's jurisdictional predicate. Justice White argued in dissent that, unlike its compan-
ion statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982), section 1981 was premised on the fourteenth amendment
which is limited to state action and thus could not reach private conduct. Runyon, 427 U.S. at
195-201.
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rights to make and enforce contracts, 169 but said nothing about
"postformation" conduct.170 Thus, a strict, literal reading would argua-
bly have foreclosed Ms. Patterson's rights.1 7 1 This literal reading, in tan-
dem with an argument that Title VII was a more appropriate vehicle for
the black woman's claims, led the Court to rule that Ms. Patterson had
no right to be heard under the statute she had used.172 This was true
despite the fact that she had claimed, without contradiction, that she was
made to sweep floors, and was demeaned on the basis of race.
In adopting its literal approach, the Court ignored the historical
context: 173 Section 1981 was enacted by Congress because it was inti-
mately concerned with addressing discriminatory practices as they ex-
isted in the Reconstruction Era.
174
As Justice Brennan notes, in addition to dismantling the black
codes, section 1981 was supposed to outlaw brutality against blacks. Sec-
tion 1981's phrase, that blacks shall have the same rights to make and
enforce contracts, was meant to do away with the then popular assump-
tion: "[Y]ou cannot make the negro work without [whipping]."'1
75 It
was a way of saying that certain minimum standards of respect were
required by law, beyond the reach of contractual negotiation. Or, said
another way, certain rights of blacks could not, under section 1981, be
bargained away. Section 1981 subordinated even the lofty ideal of free-
dom of contract to the ideal of equality.
Thus, by reading the text so literally, the Court has actually changed
the current meaning of the text to the opposite of what it was supposed to
mean. Moreover, the scheme of priorities is reversed from equality over
contract to the other way around.
Of course, the key operative term whose meaning is being circum-
scribed is not the word "contract." It is the term "civil right." The key
to Patterson is to understand that the Court feels that freedom from dis-
crimination, as a civil right, is in derogation of the common law and
169. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372.
170. Id. at 2373.
171. Id. at 2372-73.
172. Id.
173. Fuller argues literal interpretation is at odds with the inherent contingency or rules:
one can never determine if a case fits within the "core" or "periphery" of a rule without
considering the rule's intent. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1958).
174. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id.
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tolerated only so far as positive legislative commands require. Thus, the
term "civil right" has legal, but not moral, content.
176
There is a line which separates core and periphery which, for the
Court, runs parallel to common law baselines, and parallel to notions of
public and private duty. Core notions of injury, defined by analogy to
the common law, relate to issues of either contract or tort. Post-contract
comments about blacks in general, or assignment to jobs the employee
subjectively feels is menial, do not fit unambiguously into any of these
core common law categories. Thus, such claims are cast into the private
sphere.
Where the core textual authority to impose employer liability exists,
that is a public duty. Where we reach an area of ambiguity - the pe-
riphery - the Court feels the burden shifts to minorities to resolve their
difficulties privately or via some other law which is more clear.
The public/private dichotomy is strengthened by a parallel bound-
ary of positive law. The common law categories are coterminous with a
notion of positive wrongs. 177 Claims outside of these core categories are
essentially normative and finally subjective. Who is to say a black is in
any determinate sense injured by remarks about blacks as a group, for
example?178
176. A tacit layer of debate here is an argument about legitimacy. That is, within the
debate about what is "legitimate" as a civil rights claim is a debate about what is "legitimate"
as law. For liberals, law is mediated by a notion of democratic values: it requires a certain
moral order for legitimacy. The concept of civil rights, within the discourse of the law, neces-
sarily embraces moral claims because, absent the capacity to address such claims, legitimacy of
law would not exist. The Rehnquist Court, in contrast, can empty the concept of civil rights of
moral content because its notion of legitimacy is mediated by a different notion of democracy:
a minimalist, procedural construct that requires only "the rule of 'law,'" Le., positive law.
Legitimacy requires no particular moral content.
"The positivization of law means that legitimate legal validity [Rechtsgeltung] can be ob-
tained for any given contents, and that this is accomplished through a decision which confers
validity upon the law and which can take the validity from it. Positive law is valid by virtue of
decisions." J. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 98 (quoting N. LUHMANN, Positives Recht und
Ideologie in SOZlOLOGISCHE AUFKLARUNG 180 (1970)).
177. Implicitly, the vast area the Rehnquist Court cedes to the private sphere would elimi-
nate public duties with respect to noneconomic injuries involving concerns about mere "dig-
nity." This tacitly rejects moral categories, like "dignity," as incongruent with legal discourse.
This is the application of the positive concept of law at its most extreme. As we discuss more
fully below, this approach parallels the approach of the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court.
See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 106 U.S. 3, 629 (1883).
178. There is a faint echo here of Justice Brown's rhetoric in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1895):
We consider the underlying fallacy.., to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this
be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.
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What unites these "core" categories is a deep concern with value
"neutrality"; with avoiding imposition of moral constraints about how
actors in the marketplace should behave. Categories of common law in-
jury and positive law, notions of the core and the periphery in the realm
of rights, become metaphors expressing this value neutrality theme.
This complex metaphor or cognitive model would blur and dissolve
if the category of civil rights were not kept to its proper conceptual
boundaries.
179
It is finally a problem of seeing. The Court does not, or cannot, see
beyond the core of common law categories and literalist interpretation.
The' Court's interlocking assumptions about these categories, and about
interpretation, form a kind of cognitive lens that blocks the Court's social
vision. This cognitive difficulty blends into the problem of moral blind-
ness. The cognitive lens is finally the lens of ideology which perceives
only a narrow notion of what counts as law, and what counts as a right.
So long as the Court looks through its peculiar lens, the ideal of equality
will remain invisible.
To the extent that the above-mentioned cases reflect the Court's
thinking on civil rights, it is clear that the notion of judicial value neu-
trality has been abandoned. Ironically, the Court relies on the same
"neutral principles" that defined the old model. The same concepts of
formalism, original intent, and law as positive command continue to play
a central part. But, while all of these elements continue to appear in the
center of the Court's approach, they appear only as caricatured, inverted
images. A deep concern for proceduralism has been replaced with a con-
cern for substantive content. A concern with whether precedent is fol-
lowed has been replaced with a concern about whether the precedent of
predecessor courts are pure vis-d-vis the Rehnquist Court's interpretive
standards. Reconfigured, the elements of the old model no longer oper-
ate as self-restraint, but as the tools by which the Court writes into law
its God's eye view of what civil rights blacks should have.
Id. at 551.
179. Habermas suggests that there may be high psychological stakes to maintaining such a
world view: "Classical sociology never doubted that subjects capable of speaking and acting
could develop the unity of their person only in connection with identity-securing world views
and moral systems." See J. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 118. That is, one's view of the social
world represents a "moral reality" in which the individual locates his/her own sense of self. Id.
at 117-18. The Court's view of things is in a real sense not merely a legal framework, it is a
framework for organizing the social world (into public and private spheres) and of fixing their
own sense of who they are (protectors of order, safeguarding political-legal institutions from
contingency and chaos).
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The same ideological camp which had worn the pious hat of princi-
ple and restraint when they were a minority have put on the helmet of
activism and instrumentalism once majority was achieved.' But the
Court does not see its own nonneutrality. Through the lens of its rhetori-
cal strategy, in which notions of law and equality have fixed meanings,
the Court sees equilibrium even when it abandons precedent. In its ob-
jectivism, it sees past liberal civil rights frameworks as having upset the
delicate balance set by traditional jurisprudence. The Court sees itself as
merely restoring the legal order.
The Court, in its opinions, is using legal language and the process of
giving meaning to words to form a kind of hermeneutical circle around
its own majoritarian values. It is a circle that defines the limits of both
interpretation and community.
Man lives with things mainly, even exclusively, since sentiment
and action in him depend upon his mental representations as they are
conveyed to him by language. Through the same act by which he spins
language out of himself, he weaves himself into it, and every language
draws a circle around the people to which it belongs, a circle that can
only be transcended insofar as one at the same time enters another
one. 180
Unfortunately, blacks remain outside of the circle the Supreme
Court has drawn. The hermeneutic circle becomes the circle of segrega-
tion. It comes to separate constitutional ideals and constitutional pos-
sibilities, faithfully tracing the dividing line between the Word and reality
in civil rights.
III. The Mirror of History
A. The Second Coming
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
.... The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
Surely ... some revelation is at hand'81
There are perhaps two historical precedents for a judiciary writing
its God's eye view of the world into constitutional law. One occurred
during the post-Reconstruction Era (1877-1896) and the other during the
Lochner Era (1910-1933). Let's talk about Lochner first.
180. H. GATES, supra note 10, at xxi (quoting Wilhelm von Humboldt).
181. W.B. YEATS, The Second Coming, in SELECTED POEMS AND Two PLAYS OF WIL-
LIAM BUTLER YEATS 91 (Rosenthal ed. 1963).
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The Lochner Era involved the building of a constitutional "great
wall" around the interrelated institutions of private property and laissez-
faire capitalism. In the seminal case, Lochner v. New York,18 2 New York
had promulgated a statute limiting the maximum hours a baker could
work on any particular day (ten hours), and in any particular week (60
hours). 1 3 Bakers at the time worked hot, inhumanly long work
weeks. 18 4 Moreover, the predominant perception was that their predica-
ment flowed from gross inequality of bargaining power. New York at-
tempted to intervene legislatively to protect what they perceived to be a
particularly vulnerable class of workers from the excesses of twentieth
century capitalism.
The Supreme Court held that the statute"8 5 unconstitutionally "in-
terfere[d] with the right of contract between the employer and em-
ploye[e]s, concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor
in the bakery of the employer."' 1 6 The jumping off point for the Court
was an assumption that the employer and employees met as relative
equals. The context - individual workers negotiating with large corpo-
rate concerns in the age of monopoly capitalism - was simply not taken
into account.
Without considering economic realities, the Court reasoned that
both parties were grown and intelligent men: "There is no contention
that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in
other trades or manual occupations .... "1187
By curtailing the "liberty" (viz. freedom of contract) of these parties
to make bargains for their mutual benefit, a liberty interest the courts
presupposed was protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution, 88 the statute interfered
with the parties' due process rights. Here was the grand, definitive para-
dox of the Lochner approach: As archetypical formalists, the Lochner
Court was preoccupied with the idea that judges must be faithful to the
law as written down. Yet, they developed a body of doctrine holding
freedom of contract as a central constitutional value despite the fact that
this was nowhere written down. The due process clause, of course, con-
182. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
183. Id. For a discussion of the Lochner period, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, § 8-2, at 567 (2d ed. 1988).
184. The working conditions of this period are poignantly painted by Upton Sinclair. U.
SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
185. 1897 N.Y. Laws, ch. 415, art. 8, § 110.
186. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
187. Id. at 57.
188. See supra note 156 for text of the due process clause.
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tains no reference to freedom of contract and provides no textual
justification.
The implicit, definitive naked preference for a whole set of laissez-
faire centered values was justified by a guiding, undergirding vision of
what a free society was like.18 9 The structure and values of that ideal
were mirror images of the baselines and values of the common law. They
seemed natural and, indeed, inevitable.' 90
Having identified a conflict between the legislation and the due pro-
cess clause, the Court engaged in a two-step inquiry: Did the legislation
have a permissible end and, if it did, was the means used by the statute
rationally related to the legislative end involved? 191 While the Court did
not expressly reject the state's purpose of providing for public health as
illegitimate per se, in the Court's intensely hostile means analysis, the
statute was found wanting. 192
The Court found that the goal of protecting public health was not
properly connected to a statutory scheme for achieving it. First, the
health of the bakers themselves was dismissed with majestic relativism:
It may be true that the trade of a baker does not appear to be as healthy
as some other trades, but it is vastly more healthy than still others. Then
the Court quickly dispatched with the question of the health of the public
at large. "In our judgment it is not possible in fact to discover the con-
nection between the number of hours a baker may work in the bakery
and the healthful quality of the bread made by the workman."' 193
The intensity of the Court's means analysis, that is, an objective
evaluation of whether the legislative scheme rationally carries out its
goal, belies a deeper moral objection. Astute students of constitutional
law will immediately recognize that a means analysis, although a doctri-
nally separate inquiry, feeds in a circular fashion back into the initial all-
important question: Do we agree with the legislative end in the first
place?194 A means analysis is sharp or blunt, thoroughgoing or perfunc-
tory, depending on our initial assessment of the legitimacy of legislative
purpose. The underlying objection here is to any legislative end or pur-
189. See L. TRIBE, supra note 183, at 578 (arguing that the Court saw itself restoring
order, which the legislature had upset).
190. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 879 (1987).
191. Lochner examined whether there was a "public" and hence, "neutral" justification
for the statute. Id.
192. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-65 (1905).
193. Id. at 62.
194. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123
(1972). The dispute is between competing value choices and that discussions about rationality
are purely "diversionary." Id. at 154.
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pose to curtail freedom of contract. For the Lochner Court, freedom of
contract was an organizing principle of the political economy. Allied to
this was the idea that, for equilibrium, freedom of contract depended on
the maintenance of a legal equality between the parties.
For the legislature to intervene because one party to the bargain has
fared badly would render the notion of equality between bargaining enti-
ties incoherent. Consequently, the very idea of freedom of contract,
upon which the Court's conception of a free market rested, would come
undone. "If this statute [is] valid ... there would seem to be no length to
which legislation of this nature might not go."195 The common law pre-
cept, that whatever the parties decide is the contract between them, be-
comes central to the economic order.
Thus, to protect the contractarian framework, a whole class of legis-
lative ends was placed beyond the power of the legislature: socio-eco-
nomic legislation which redistributed benefits or rights contrary to the
baselines dictated by common law notions of contract was deemed illicit,
illegal, and forbidden.
Such narrowing of legislative ends draws a bright line to demarcate
where government power stops and individual liberty begins.196 It also
seemed natural to not only read into the due process clause the substan-
tive value of freedom of contract, but to center the constitutionalism of
the era upon that principle too.
But if freedom of contract was the center of the constitutional uni-
verse, that substantive value had in turn, like a wheel within a wheel,
97
an elaborate internal structure. Freedom of contract was not merely the
principle by which relationships between employer and employee, mas-
ters and servants, were governed; rather, it was the vehicle which carried
forward the fault model and classically liberal notions of individual
rights.
For example, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,98 a 1923 decision
invalidating minimum wage legislation, the Court, ostensibly using free-
dom of contract/substantive due process notions, said:
195. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58.
196. The lines, though perhaps now long erased since the rise of the regulatory state, ap-
peared quite bright and natural against the baselines of common law.
197. The metaphor is from Ezekiel:
The appearance of the wheels and their construction was a crystal, a single likeness
to the four of them, their appearance and construction as if there were a wheel in the
middle of a wheel... [w]ithsoever the spirit was to go they went... for the spirit of
the living creature was in the wheels.
1 Ezekiel 16:20.
198. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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To the extent that the sum fixed [by the minimum wage statute] ex-
ceeds the fair value of the services rendered, it amounts to a compul-
sory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent
person, for whose condition there rests upon him no particular responsi-
bility .... 199
Ultimately, this argument rests on the claim that, simply, there
should be no liability without fault: No taking of money from A to give
to B without a showing of responsibility (i.e., fault) on the part of A.
This principle of no liability without fault, the core notion of the
traditional fault model, acts in the first instance as a legitimating device.
Proponents of this model posit, as a kind of first principle, that distribu-
tions which are based on fault are rational, and therefore legitimate.
Conversely, measured against the same standard, distributions which do
not take fault into account are irrational and illegitimate. It is rational to
make someone who has done something wrong pay a price to redeem his
acts. It is irrational to do this to someone without fault: such a person is
innocent. To say it is irrational is to say we have no justification accepta-
ble to a reasonable person or no objective justification.
If we look still deeper, if we increase the power of our analytical
microscope yet another notch, we recognize that within this notion of no
liability without fault there is a notion of equality. The reason that, as a
matter of constitutional law, there should be no liability without fault is
not because it is irrational, but because of the implications of this irra-
tionality. Distinctions between citizens must be justified on neutral or
objective grounds as a matter of basic equality. To take from A to give to
B in the absence of a rational basis is, by definition, to take from A to
give to B on the basis of some nonneutral, nonobjective ground.
It is, in fact, to discriminate against A on the basis of a subjective
choice (naked preference again). Thus, while the Constitution does not
prohibit something merely unfair vis-d-vis common law norms, this dis-
crimination, this naked preference for A (e.g., bakers) over B (e.g., em-
ployers) is what the Constitution does not allow. 2°° It is thus the
principle of equality, albeit a quintessentially procedural, formal version
of equality to be sure, which is at the very heart of the fault model in the
Lochnerian constitutional tradition.
Ironically, then, legislative schemes premised on Lochner Era work-
ers' claims to real equality were frustrated by a framework ultimately
based on a claim of formal equality. One concept of equality was at war
with the very idea of the other. Said another way, the formal equality
199. Id. at 557-58 (emphasis added).
200. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (Chase, J., dissenting).
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concept as applied by the Lochner Court rendered the concept of real
equality inconceivable as equality; it became, through the Lochnerian
lens of formal equality, another form of discrimination. Thus, formal
equality operated as a rhetorical strategy, that is, a linguistic limitation
on how one could speak of a concept. In the Lochner Era, this rhetorical
strategy suppressed at the conceptual level any dialogue about redistribu-
tion or real equality.
The Lochner paradigm ultimately ends in its collision with the pow-
erful forces surrounding the New Deal, including both the political impe-
tus of Roosevelt, and the increasing power of the realist movement which
exploited the gulf between social context and the Lochner approach. 20 1
Doctrinally, Lochner was rejected because the Court ultimately realized,
taking social context into account, that the Lochner approach really was
not neutral after all.202
The parallels between the Lochner approach and the Rehnquist
Court's civil rights jurisprudence are so obvious as to tempt one to say
perhaps this is Lochner's second coming.
There is the same use of common law baselines as constitutional
imperatives: In Lochner, the fault model was the canon under which all
socio-economic legislation was judged, and in the Rehnquist Court's ju-
risprudence, it becomes the canon by which all discrimination claims are
judged. This canonical obedience to the fault model blinded the Rehn-
quist Court, for example, to the systematic, virtually plantation style seg-
regation of the poor Aleuts in Wards Cove, and to the discriminatory
character of the caste-like, one-race construction contracting industry in
Croson.
As in Lochner, formal equality, the normative commandment at the
center of the fault model, is the golden preemptive rule: it becomes the
only legitimate conception of the antidiscrimination principle pre-empt-
ing all others. Under the iron Lochner paradigm, any deviation from
mere formal equality, such as affirmative or, more exactly, redistributive
efforts to help a disadvantaged social group, is not merely invalid but
reprehensible as well. Looked at through the formalist lens, this "affirm-
201. See generally STONE, SEIDMAN, SUNSTEIN, & TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
168, 743-44 (1986) (explaining the demise of the Lochner approach as a retreat from formal
common law assumptions about the 'naturalness' of private ordering).
202. See West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1923) ("[E]xploitation of a class
of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power... casts a direct
burden of their support upon the community." Once the problem of wages and working con-
ditions was reconceived as a public rather than a private issue, the Court no longer viewed it as
"neutral" for the government to stand by and allow inequalities to go on unabated.).
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ative action" is not "race-neutral," it is just discrimination. 20 3 Affirma-
tive responses to the plight of bakers becomes legislative preference for
bakers, affirmative responses to the plight of blacks becomes legislative
preference for blacks.
There is a danger that a racial classification [viz affirmative action
quota] is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of
racial politics. If there is no duty to attempt either to measure the
recovery by the wrong or to distribute that recovery within the injured
class in an evenhanded way, our history will adequately support a leg-
islative preference for almost any ethnic, religious, or racial group with
the political strength to negotiate "a piece of the action" for its
members. 2
04
Moreover, there is in this imposition of moral values, as in Lochner,
a confusion of normative assumptions for facts.
The Court in Croson views the existence of a legislative distribution
to blacks, in absence of proof sufficient to meet the fault model, as a plain
instance of discrimination. Distributions which do not satisfy the fault
model are not merely unjustifiable, relative to common law baselines, as a
normative judgment, they are simply unjustified period, as if this were an
observation of fact, Le., "the truth. ' 20 5 The Court sees itself not as im-
posing its personal values, but as imposing a standard as neutral as the
sun rising in the East. There is again a strong notion that all this is
natural and inevitable.
In Lochner, the idea that common law baselines were natural in this
way was justified on the basis of a grand appeal to legal order: unless
203. The Court's conception of neutrality is captured by William's paradigm of the sau-
sage machine.
You have this thing called a sausage ... machine. You put pork and spices in the top
and crank it up, and because it is a sausage machine, what comes out the other end is
sausage. Over time, everyone knows that anything that comes out... is... sausage.
In fact, there is a law passed that says it's indisputably sausage.
Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2128, 2130 (1989).
This label continues to apply even if "one day we throw in ... rodents... a teddy bear
and a chicken." Id. The Court's reasoning about neutrality is equally circular. The Court's
concept of the neutral starting point is discrimination as an intentionalist model. This model is
the Court's sausage machine. Everything produced by the model is "neutral." This neutrality
persists even when we throw in chronic, stark patterns of de facto segregation and produce no
legal "wrong." There is within this model a tyranny over words that grinds against one's sense
of logic and justice.
204. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989) (quoting Fulliove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 539 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
205. This is again a reflection of the Court's objectivism. They assume a one-to one crre-
spondence between the words they use and the inferences they make about patterns of social
behavior. See supra note 53.
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contractarian baselines remained bright, the boundaries between individ-
ual rights and state power would be impossible to define.2°6
This approach echoes throughout Justice O'Connor's opinion. For
example, when the Croson Court rejects societal discrimination on the
grounds that it did not fit the intent and causation requirements of the
fault model, the Court makes its underlying theoretical concern explicit:
if we allow societal discrimination, in effect throwing out the fault
model's proof parameters, there would be "no logical stopping point,"
really, no boundary between the sphere of individual rights and judicial
power.
[B]ecause the [societal discrimination] theory ha[s] no relation to some
basis for believing a constitutional or statutory violation ha[s] oc-
curred, it could be used to "justify" race-based decision-making essen-
tially limitless in scope and duration (citation omitted). In absence of
particularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless
in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the
future. 20
7
Unfortunately, there is no way for the Court to achieve a broader
social or historical understanding of responsibility within the two dimen-
sions of its model.
The Courts also share interpretive canons. What makes the Rehn-
quist Court's theoretical rigidity possible is the similar way in which it,
like its doctrinal antecedent, has made a studied effort to situate itself not
in a social context, not in the actual experience of minorities as an histor-
ically excluded group, but in a transcendental, formalistic false reality.
Nowhere is this transcendentalism more intense than in Croson. There
the Court suggests that the only interest the city of Richmond had in
using a quota instead of relief to identified victims was "administrative
convenience." 208
Both in terms of the yawning gap between the law and social needs,
and in the operation of common law baselines to rationalize this gap as
legally irrelevant, the Court did nothing original. They did it the old
fashioned way - they Lochnered.
B. Echos of 1883
[T]he substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitu-
tion have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism
206. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). "If this statue [is] valid ... there would
seem to be no length to which legislation of this nature might not go." Id. at 58.
207. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276
(1986)).
208. Id. at 729.
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.... Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty, ...
have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to ac-
complish, ... and which they supposed they had accomplished by
changes in their fundamental law.
20 9
Disturbing as the spectre of Lochner may be, as it whispers through
Wards Cove and Croson, there is yet an even more ominous echo if one
listens closely to the Rehnquist Court's declarations on discrimination.
In Patterson and in Croson, both the interpretive approach it uses and the
social assumptions which fuel that approach, harken back to the infa-
mous Civil Rights Cases of 1883.
The Rehnquist Court is developing two themes. One is that, using
the fault model, we must particularize equality claims if individuals are
to be held liable. The other theme, using an interpretive approach devoid
of moral inquiry, is the tendency to privatize it, to push it out of the
realm of constitutional discourse altogether. Lochner is the paradigm for
the first theme, the Civil Rights Cases are the paradigm for the second.
The Civil Rights Cases arose out of a challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (the "Act").210 The Act was passed
during the fleeting historical moment when the Radical Republicans
2 1
attained political ascendancy. It prohibited, inter alia, discrimination on
the basis of race in public accommodations, and it provided both crimi-
nal and civil liability for persons violating provisions of the Act. The
Civil Rights Cases consolidated criminal appeals in four cases, 212 and an
appeal of a civil penalty in another. The question, as the Court framed it,
was: "[HIas Congress constitutional power to make such a law?"
213
This becomes the question of whether the Act was authorized by the
Reconstruction A mendments.214 This leads us to the classic inquiry into
the meaning and intent of the amendments involved.
209. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
210. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
211. The "Radical Republicans" represented the left wing of the post-bellum Republican
Party. While the Republicans shared a desire to make emancipation permanent, the "Radical
Republicans" wanted a more far reaching social transformation. They were generally associ-
ated with constituencies "centered in New England and the belt of New England migration
that stretched across the rural North." See E. FONER, supra note 27, at 228. "At the core of
[Radical Republicanism] were men whose careers had been shaped... by the slavery contro-
versy: Charles Sumner, Ben Wade, and Henry Wilson in the Senate; Thaddeus Stevens,
George W. Julian, and James Ashley in the House." Id.
212. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4 (for denying blacks admission to inns, hotels,
and theaters).
213. Id. at 19.
214. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV.
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In the Court's textualist analysis, it is the fourteenth amendment
which becomes the focal point of the inquiry because of its unique equal
protection language.
215
The first sentence of section one, that "[a]ll persons born... in the
United States... are citizens of the United States and the State wherein
they reside" is potentially a rich and powerful proclamation that reverses
Dred Scott. 21 6 Interestingly, the Court passed over this declaration of
rights without any effort to discern its meaning. It is obliquely men-
tioned, but not interpreted. Instead, the Court focused, with a studied
literalism, on the remaining passages, all of which enunciate limitations
on states. The Court thus reasons that, as the language of the amend-
ment repeatedly says "no State," it really means no State: It declares
that: "[Nor] shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law . . . ." It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is
not the subject matter of the amendment.
217
In choosing its literal approach, the Court also implicitly rejected
the path of normative inquiry. The express words of the amendment,
like points in space, are the beginning and the end of the discussion.
There is no search for a deeper underlying set of values to unite the
words into a coherent normative scheme.
218
The Court did not stop there, however. It grounded the result
reached by literalism in an idea of federal civil rights defined by, or im-
prisoned within, really, a theory of federal/state relations. The central
idea is that the federal government may insure that states provide due
process, as a grand ideal of procedural fairness for all citizens, but not go
further to compel what the federal government feels is a fair result in
215. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 719 (1989).
216. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). In the infamous decision
by Justice Taney, the Court held, inter alia, that Dred Scott remained a slave despite his
temporary sojourn in the "free state" of Illinois. In Taney's view, Scott's claims relied on the
notion that he could be a United States citizen capable of suing in United States courts. Taney
held that the original intent of the Constitution was that neither slaves nor their descendants
were intended to be "citizens" within the meaning of the Constitution. See also D.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE (1978) (discussing the historical background of the
Dred Scott case).
217. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
218. See Pierson v. Ray, 358 U.S. 547 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas berates
the Court for its "'atomistic conception of intention' " coupled with " 'a pointer theory of
meaning.' "....This view conceives of the mind to be directed toward individual things rather
than toward general ideas ....... Id. at 560 (quoting L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 84
(1964)). This "pointer" theory of interpretation militates not only against general ideas but
also any search for broader values.
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specific cases. It may compel the states to refrain from discrimination
(procedural fairness again), but not make affirmative laws to promote
equality.
It is absurd to affirm that, because the [Amendment seeks to protect
against invasion of the] rights of life, liberty and property (which in-
clude all civil rights that men have), are by the amendment sought to
be protected against invasion on the part of the State without due pro-
cess of law, Congress may therefore provide due process of law for
their vindication in every case; and that, because the denial by a State
to any persons, of the equal protection of the laws, is prohibited by the
amendment, therefore Congress may establish laws for their equal
protection.
219
The sphere of federal power ends where state power begins, with the
federal interest of preserving due process as the arbiter of where the line
is drawn. Thus, the due process or procedural fairness model would
reach any instances where the state has deprived someone of something,
but would not be triggered in the absence of state action. The boundary
between state and federal power is also coterminous with the boundary
between a jurisdictionally constrained notion of formal equality and
equality of result.
It follows that the contour of a federal civil right, whose dimensions
can be no greater than the power which creates it, is delimited by the
same boundary drawn by due process and state action. In the world view
of the Civil Rights Cases, the same textually grounded jurisdictional logic
which defines federal power over states defines the concept of a civil
right.
If the notion of a civil right is the notion of a federal limitation on
state power, it is also true that only a state can deprive an individual of a
civil right.
[C]ivil rights... cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individu-
als, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws .... The...
individual['s] ... is [still] a private wrong.., an invasion of the rights
of the injured party, it is true .... but if not sanctioned in some way by
the State, or not done under State authority, his rights remain in full
force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the
State for redress. 2
20
There is here an intricate hierarchy implying two distinct levels of
rights, two distinct levels of interference, and two distinct levels of rem-
edy. This two-level theory of civil rights relies on the principle that the
remedy is a mirror image of the wrong.221
219. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13.
220. Id. at 17.
221. Cf. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, (1919) (holding rights
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This abrogation and denial of rights, for which the states alone were
or could be held responsible, was the great seminal and fundamental
wrong which was intended to be remedied. And the remedy must be
predicated upon that wrong. It must assume that in the cases provided
for, the evil or wrong actually committed rests upon that state law.
222
Thus, the Court tightly entraps the idea of civil rights in a web of
textualism, artificial distinctions, and jurisdictional constraints.
223
What underlies all this are a number of assumptions. In the context
of the federal government limiting the power of individuals to do as they
wish - to discriminate against blacks, for example - procedural con-
cerns about who is acting come before substantive concerns about
whether they are doing good, concerns about power come before con-
cerns about rights, and concerns about text come before moral concerns.
This hierarchy of concerns reflects an implicit division of the moral uni-
verse into public and private spheres. There is a realm for positive, legal
concerns - who has the power, what does the text say - and a separate
realm for thinking about substantive, moral questions. Indeed, the no-
tion of different spheres of power is, as a metaphor, reciprocal of this
moral cosmology.
To paraphrase Justice Harlan, however, even in its own, intensely
textualist terms, this model was achieved by interpretive sleight of hand.
Assuming the Court's intensely textualist methodology was appropriate,
it glaringly omits critical portions of the text. There was in the first line
of the fourteenth amendment a textual basis for locating affirmative
rights within the fourteenth amendment. As Justice Harlan noted:
correlative of duties). The Civil Rights Cases complicate the correlative relationship by requir-
ing a prior inquiry as to who has duties under the statute and who has the power to enforce
them. The notions of right and duty, foundational at common law, are secondary considera-
tions. Jurisdictional considerations are primary.
222. Id. at 36-38.
223. This intensely legalistic framework reflects the studied relegation of black moral
claims to the category of positive law. There is an historical connection, I think. Natural Law
still had currency in 1883. Historically, efforts to contain the "natural" rights of blacks de-
pended on civil rights being bound up in a positive mode of inquiry. See, eg., Somerset v.
Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772):
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any
reasons, moral or political; but only positive law, which preserves its force long after
the reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created, is erased from
memory: it is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law.
Id. at 510. See also Gudridge, Privileges and Permissions: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 8 LAW
& PHIL. 83, 94 (1989) (arguing that the non-person status of slaves was constructed by the
law's studied refusal to refer directly to the rights of slaves, but rather to the property rights of
slave owners or the duties that society might impose on free persons in dealing with chattel
slaves).
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The first clause of the first section - "All persons born . . . in the
United States.... are citizens.., of the State wherein they reside" -
is of a distinctly affirmative character .... [T]hey were brought, by
this supreme act of the nation, within the direct operation of that pro-
vision of the Constitution which declares that "the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States." (citation omitted).
The citizenship thus acquired, by that race, in virtue of an affirma-
tive grant from the nation, may be protected... [from] congressional
legislation of a primary direct character .... 224
A forthright search for the meaning of this amendment might have
taken us to a fruitful discussion of what the privileges and immunities of
a citizen were.225 For Harlan, freedom from discrimination "by individ-
uals or corporations exercising public functions" was axiomatic of citi-
zenship, unless the recent amendments were "splendid baubles, thrown
out to delude those who deserved fair.., treatment .... Citizenship in
this country necessarily imports at least equality of civil rights among
citizens of every race .. "226
Inns and other places were public in the sense that, under common
law, "the law gives [them] special privileges and . . . charge[s] [them]
with certain duties ... to the public. '227 Although not entirely articu-
lated, the rationale for finding a civil right of access to public places, as
later explained in Harlan's dissent in Plessy,228 seems to flow from two
things. First, the common law tradition was that inns and other places
were forbidden from discriminating in general. To discriminate against
blacks deprived them of an actual, undisputed common law right. But,
more importantly, as he notes in his Plessy dissent, there is a notion of
stigma: by being set apart, there is an injury. Moreover, the injury of
being set apart from the community is inconsistent with the fourteenth
amendment's inclusive design to make blacks part of the community
which comprised the sovereignty.
It is the language of affirmative values - citizenship, community
and stigma - which underlie and empower Harlan's analysis. These
224. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 46.
225. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873), which involved white
plaintiffs attempting to use the fourteenth amendment to challenge a state-sponsored monop-
oly, the Supreme Court held that the "privileges and immunities clause" protected only a few
rights. However, even from a strict doctrinal perspective, this left open the question of what
those rights were. Although Slaughter-House prefigured and heralded what was to come, it is
not really until the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the Supreme Court entirely
forecloses the use of "privileges and immunities" as a textual peg for securing black equality.
226. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 48.
227. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
228. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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normative concepts of community and stigma, inviting a kind of histori-
cal search and appraisal of "freedoms" enjoyed by citizens, set the terms
for the ensuing civil rights debate that culminates seven decades later in
Brown. Brown's discussion of the stigma to black children was a dialogue
whose framework was constructed by Justice Harlan in 1883.
The Court, in rejecting the citizenship inquiry, rejects as well the
rich normative framework Harlan offers. It substitutes a purely positive
dialogue about negative prohibitions devoid of even the language to artic-
ulate the conflict between constitutional values and permitting discrimi-
nation in inns and taverns.
The result of all this was to reverse the basic assumptions of Recon-
struction. The Republicans had fought a war not merely to abolish slav-
ery, but to secure freedom for the emancipated slaves. The fourteenth
amendment existed to fill the gap between the thirteenth amendment and
the freedom ideal. The genius of the fourteenth amendment was that it
translated the search for the residual meaning of freedom into the idiom
of equality, and that it translated the search for a definition of equality
into a dialogue about citizenship.
This use of citizenship as a lens to locate equality gives the inquiry a
substantive focus. The question becomes what are the substantive rights
of citizens. 229 Beyond mere concerns about procedural fairness, this
posits a need to include blacks within the concept of community. Blacks
are translated from being simply an "other" to becoming "integrated"
into the concept of a national "self."
While this conflicted with traditional southern notions about race,
having won the war, Radical Republicans sought to institutionalize their
own ideals. The clash between the Republican notion of what equality
required and what the Old South wanted did not stop with the ratifica-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, but it continued in, and was chroni-
cled by, the debates about the Civil Rights Bill of 1875. The debates
carried forward original southern opposition to racial reform and repre-
sented a continuation of the war on a political plane.
The Act of 1875 represented an integral part of a Radical Republi-
can strategy to finally, pre-emptively resolve a debate about the scope of
citizenship and hence equality. Southern opposition to the bill, which
proposed to remove the burden of race from emancipated slaves in their
229. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 2675 (1866) (remarks of Senator How-
ard). Howard identifies citizenship with the notion of "privileges and immunities." Howard
quotes Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) for a list of these
immunities which include both Bill of Rights protections and natural law rights, such as the
right to own property, and to travel freely through the several states.
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contracts with innkeepers and the like, hinged on the theory that this
touched on an area the government could not reach.
The traditional southern position was expressed by Joshua Hill in
the original debates:
I must confess, sir, that I cannot see the magnitude of this subject. I
object to this great Government descending to the business of regulat-
ing the hotels and the common taverns of this country, and the street
railroads, stage-coaches, and everything of that sort. It looks to me to
be a petty business for the Government of the United States .... 230
and
What he may term a right may be the right of any man that pleases to
come into my parlor and to be my guest. That is not the right of any
colored man upon earth, nor of any white man, unless it is agreeable to
me.23
1
There is the idea that government power is relegated to a distinct
and different plane than that occupied by choices about personal dealings
and associations. It follows that the government cannot rightfully de-
scend from its proper domain to intrude on the plane of personal choice.
Similarly, rights and duties are associated with the plane of government
power, and they likewise may not intrude upon the plane of personal
tastes about association and the like.
Sumner, speaking for the Radical Republicans, epitomized an op-
posing conception:
The Senator may choose his associates as he pleases .... That taste
which the Senator has now declared belongs to him he will have free
liberty to exercise always ... but when it comes to rights, there the
Senator must obey the law .... Show me, therefore, a legal institution,
anything created or regulated by law, and I show you what must be
open equally to all without distinction of color.
232
For Sumner, discrimination against blacks by individuals, in the set-
ting of inns and places of public accommodation, was a matter of rights.
For Hill, it was a matter of taste.
By enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the verdict of the Recon-
struction Congress was that Sumner was right and Hill was wrong.
The Court in the Civil Rights Cases reverses the statutory outcome
of the original debate about the civil "rights" of blacks. The court substi-
tuted Hill's conception of discrimination as a matter of private choice for
Sumner's Radical Republican conception of discrimination as a depriva-
230. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1871) (remarks of Senator Hill).
231. Id.
232. Id. (remarks of Senator Sumner).
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tion of rights. Not only did the Civil Rights Cases adopt the same dichot-
omy as Hill, it adopted the same rationale.
The parallels between the Civil Rights Cases and the current civil
rights approach are uncanny. There is the same use, in 1989, of textual-
ism to pre-empt normative inquiry and to frustrate the search for a co-
herent set of values articulated by the act or amendment in question.
Moreover, this textualism is used in tandem with a rigid jurisdictional
framework to not only erect barriers at the procedural level in civil rights
cases, but at the conceptual level as well, to limit the definition of a civil
right. (The approach in Croson and in Patterson are so similar as to cor-
roborate a common doctrinal ancestry). Beyond creating mere difficul-
ties of proof, this approach places certain kinds of injustices beyond the
power of courts or states to address, beyond the power of courts to speak
of or conceive of these injustices as legal wrongs.
Recall in Patterson there was a Reconstruction statute enacted to
protect blacks from humiliations linked to the tradition of slavery preva-
lent in the master/servant relationship between blacks and whites.
Through a transparent use of literalism, the Court obscures the norma-
tive scope of the Act and limits it to express prohibitions concerning for-
mation of contracts. The same literalism grounded jurisdictional
argument that privatized discrimination in 1883 echoes in Patterson.
Mirroring 1883, the Court in Patterson uses an intensely literal the-
ory of meaning to distort civil rights legislation into mere text devoid of
social goals. The very core of legislative concern - the nexus between
slavery and the humiliation experienced by blacks in the master/servant
relationship - becomes invisible to the Court. It lies beyond the horizon
of the Court's interpretive approach. Under the Court's interpretation,
blacks, after making an employment contract, may be humiliated and
degraded by white employers in ways that mirror the same degradation
the Reconstruction Congress sought to eliminate from the marketplace.
Yet, again, as in 1883, the Court can see no wrong.
In Croson, the echo becomes a roar. The Court enunciates a con-
temporary version of the two-level theory used in the Civil Rights Cases.
Recall that the Croson Court relies on the textual basis that Section Five
gives Congress special powers to enforce the fourteenth amendment. In
Croson, as in 1883, there are two levels of government, each limited to a
distinct plane of activity. Concomitantly, in Croson, as in the paradigm
of the Civil Rights Cases, the standard of legality of government action
turns not on normative principles, but upon a theory of federal/state re-
lations defined by these notions of separate planes of power.
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The rich, complex normative inquiry about the danger of caste, the
problem of stigma, the impact of chronic marketplace inequalities on
fourteenth amendment values of citizenship and community is foreclosed
by the focus on text and "planes of power." This imagery mirrors the
moral cosmology of 1883: that normative inquiry has no place in the
public, positive sphere of legal discourse. The approach which animated
the Court in the doctrinal tradition beginning with Brown, and recurring
in Fullilove, is not pursued and cannot be pursued within the nineteenth
century world view that the Court revives in Croson.
The strategy, operating at the level of how we conceptualize notions
of rights and remedies, now as in 1883, is to reorganize the discrimina-
tion idea around a narrowing premise: that both the legacy of slavery
and noneconomic claims of blacks are to have no meaning in the legal
world.
The cases seem, in a real sense, to be modem installments in the
continuing, historic debate between Sumner and Hill. In the Court's cos-
mology, the Warren and Burger Courts are located within the same nor-
mative arc as Sumner, seeking to expand the concept of discrimination
beyond its proper scope as a private wrong. The Rehnquist Court
behaves as if this were again the post-Reconstruction Era, and as if it
were the post-Reconstruction Court. Mirroring the Court in the Civil
Rights Cases, it seeks to achieve the contemporary equivalent of a rever-
sal of the basic Reconstruction assumptions about the scope of the dis-
crimination and the equality ideal.
Conclusion: The Fierce Urgency of Now
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the
true meaning of its creed, "We hold these truths to be self-evident that
all men are created equal." I have a dream that one day ... sons of
former slaves and the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit
down together at the table of brotherhood. ....
I have a dream that one day "every valley shall be exalted and
every hill and mountain made low . . . and all flesh shall see it
together."
This will be the day when all of God's children will be able to sing
... [flree at last. Free at last. Thank God Almighty, we are free at
last.233
It is midnight within the American social order. 234 The evidence
accumulates that the chronic political and economic gulf between blacks
233. Speech by Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King (August 28, 1963) reprinted in Ebony Mag.,
Jan. 1986, at 40, 42.
234. See M.L. KING, supra note 115, at 51.
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and whites worsens.235 As the gulf widens, there is a terrible resurgence
of racist speech and racially motivated attacks on blacks. 236 As Professor
Luban has noted, there is the most serious question of whether a nation
which has been racist in the past is not in danger of becoming irredeema-
bly so again.237 It is against this background that the jurisprudence of
the Rehnquist Court ought to be considered.
The cases represent not merely an expression of legal rules, they
represent in a real sense a conceptualization of national ideals about
equality. In defining this word "equality," the Court, in effect, defines
the moral identity of America itself.
This is true because America has, within its own story of origin,
chosen equality as the ideal by which it would be legitimated and defined.
This story of origin, told originally by Jefferson as a myth about a fictive
"democracy" that excluded blacks, resonates and is retold as a redemp-
tive story about a true, inclusive democracy by Dr. King. It is King's
more ethically complete story which now mediates between America's
segregated past and the hope of redemption in the future.
The Rehnquist Court's decisions, however, exclude King's narrative
- a narrative which began doctrinally in Brown.
The new decisions are the herald of a new constitutionalism - un-
critical of its own intense moral anxiety - which presupposes a neutral
definition of equality as formal equality only. Concomitantly, the Court
presupposes that a neutral discourse about equality must occur within
the boundaries of positive law. Within this neutral territory of pure law,
there is no room for moral inquiry, or the search for a substantive mean-
ing of equality.
These interpretive boundaries divide, once more, the constitutional
universe into public and private spheres, with moral aspiration squarely
in the private realm. King's narrative - which takes place only in the
235. See supra note 163.
236. "A 16 year old black youth [Yusef Hawkins] was shot to death ... in an attack by 10-
30 white teen-agers in the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn .... The whites, the authorities
said, were lying in wait for black or Hispanic youths whom they thought were dating a white
neighborhood girl." N. Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at 1, col. 1. See also Matsuda, Public Re-
sponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2320-30
(1989) cataloging a number of documented incidents.
Matsuda's extensive catalogue includes a black woman who lost four fingers in an appar-
ently race motivated pipe bomb attack, spray painting of hate messages on black churches, and
racist harassment, including death threats, against black employees by co-workers. Id. at
2321-70.
237. Luban, supra note 163, at 2159.
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realm of our highest moral aspirations - is relegated to a place beyond
the horizon of the law.
Thus, we can only hear King if we cross the tension bridge between
American legal reality and the normative world. That tension bridge is
not merely the bridge between law and value, but equally the bridge that
separates liberal and conservative, black and white. It is the same bridge
which separates an alternative national future from the perpetuation of
the past.
The story the Court tells about the limits of equality and legal inter-
pretation is the sign by which the Court blocks the bridge. It tell us not
to cross over because there is nothing but ideology and chaos outside of
the world of pure law. The sign says "NE PLUS ULTRA": nothing
beyond. This sign marks the limit of our discourse.
The discursive limit becomes the limit of social possibility. It blocks
not only a discussion about competing notions of equality and law, it
blocks redemption.
The Rehnquist Court has situated America across the tension
bridge, within a cramped, barren legal world in which it cannot find the
true meaning of equality. Nor, therefore, can it find a way to make
moral sense of itself. America cannot find the moral truth it needs be-
cause, from its distance across the bridge, within the detached world the
Rehnquist Court has made, it cannot hear the story of Dr. King. It was
a good story, full of dreams.
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